

R-1092-ARPA
June 1973

In Search of Self-Reliance: U. S. Security Assistance to the Third World Under the Nixon Doctrine

Guy J. Pauker, Steven Canby,
A. Ross Johnson and William B. Quandt

A Report prepared for
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

25th
Year



The research described in this Report was sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under contract No. DAHC15-73-C-0181. Reports of The Rand Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.

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PREFACE

In his Guam speech of July 1969, President Nixon, responding to changed international circumstances, first indicated in broad outline a substantial redirection of U.S. policies on security assistance to Third World countries. Since then much attention has been devoted, both inside and outside Government, to the formulation and implementation of the Nixon Doctrine that resulted from this redirection of policy.

The discussion of concepts in this report is intended as a contribution to the ongoing national debate over the operational implications of the Nixon Doctrine, especially how to reduce the American military presence abroad without retreating into isolationism. The purpose of the report is to question some basic concepts that guided U.S. national security policy toward the Third World in the past, and on the basis of this reappraisal to offer some conceptual alternatives for U.S. security assistance planning under the Nixon Doctrine. The report does not attempt to duplicate the detailed policy planning and programming efforts that have been conducted within the Executive Branch, particularly in the Security Assistance Plans, Policy and Program Formulation Directorate, in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and in the office of the Under Secretary of State for Coordinating Security Assistance.

With the exception of one section, this report is a collective effort in that the ideas of the authors so converged and fused during collaboration that it would be difficult to identify their specific contribution. The exception is Section III, "Revising Third World Defenses," written by Steven L. Canby, who specializes in military analysis. The other coauthors specialize in major geographical areas: Guy J. Pauker (leader of the project), Southeast Asia; A. Ross Johnson, East Europe; and William B. Quandt, the Middle East and North Africa.

SUMMARY

Certain conceptual premises of the Nixon Doctrine require further refinement. "Total-force planning" will remain applicable to NATO's Central Front in the 1970s and might become valid for security arrangements between the United States, Australia, and Japan. Total-force planning is, however, of questionable utility for shaping our military relations with developing nations that lack technological skills and an indigenous industrial base. "Regionalism," too, has severe limitations as a conceptual guideline for U.S. security assistance to the Third World. The ability of the United States to promote regionalism in the absence of a genuine preexisting mutuality of interests linking nations together must be doubted. Prudence would argue for allowing the countries in question to take the lead in exploring possibilities for regional security cooperation, with the U.S. role being limited to bilateral consultation and assistance.

Instead of relying primarily on total-force planning or regionalism in the Third World, U.S. security assistance to developing countries in the 1970s should be guided by the concept of self-reliance. A self-reliant nation is one possessing a national will to depend as little as possible on external assistance in matters of national defense and internal security. Its government will make a realistic effort to mobilize the population to defend itself, utilizing a variety of means ranging from local militias to standing reserves of the regular army. It will adopt a corresponding military doctrine and defense strategy. Doctrines of self-reliance developed in Indonesia and Yugoslavia are relevant to other parts of the Third World. In both countries, the military establishments have refined concepts of defensive warfare using strong deterrent forces that rely on large numbers of lightly armed combatants. The intent is not to hold territory in the initial stages of an invasion but ultimately to bog down an invader by making continued occupation of the country too costly to be worthwhile.

The reshaping of U.S. military deployments and security assistance will have to be done gradually and carefully to allow stabilizing adjustments. But American objectives in the 1970s are likely to be best served by the existence of a pluralistic global system of nations that are as self-reliant and independent as circumstances permit. Such nations will further U.S. interests not only because they remain independent of our potential enemies but also because they do not become our clients and thus a burdensome drain on our resources, and often political albatrosses as well. Self-reliant nations will have the self-confidence to permit stable relations with the United States in the likely eventuality of Congressional reduction of the high

levels of aid that our Third World arms recipients, especially the forward-defense countries, have come to expect. Self-reliant nations will be less prone to become militarily dependent on the Soviet Union in a future situation where the USSR has large amounts of surplus equipment available for military-assistance programs while the United States is no longer able to provide such equipment in comparable quantities. American abstention from providing Third World countries with sophisticated weapons for offensive operations is also likely to curtail regional arms races.

The U.S. Government can encourage self-reliance among recipients of military assistance through the arms it supplies and through the training and advice it gives for organization and doctrine. Implementation of the Nixon Doctrine need not and should not mean the expensive replication of U.S.-style military establishments abroad. "Modernization" of Third World defense forces that takes the form of pouring in equipment and organizational techniques developed for U.S. forces will hinder rather than promote self-reliance. Such American features of defense organization can alienate a Third World nation from its real threats and impair its defensive capabilities. In any case, the Congress and the American public are unlikely to continue to pay for such high-cost security assistance in the 1970s.

Self-reliance can be promoted through U.S. arms transfers emphasizing military systems using inexpensive, easily maintained arms—especially those not needing complex logistic support—that can eventually be locally produced. Instead of the complex aircraft, artillery, and tracked vehicles furnished by the United States in the past, Third World countries need cheaper aeronautical systems, ground-force weapons, and mobility keyed to their own needs. A broadly based light-infantry force and corresponding doctrines could be substituted for the heavy infantry systems initially designed for an American Expeditionary Force in Europe. Air and naval forces should become secondary concerns.

These recommendations are supported, and made more specific, by analysis of the likely threats—attack by the USSR or PRC, subtheater conventional conflict, and subtheater insurgency and combined insurgency/external attack—that major Third World recipients of U.S. security assistance may face in the 1970s.

Faced with involvement in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, Greece and Turkey, if they are to fight conventionally, must be prepared to withdraw to defensible lines that cannot be readily enveloped by Soviet mechanized and airborne forces. The two countries cannot be expected to divert major Soviet forces from the central front in such a conflict; nor is it necessary for the Turks to hold the shores of the Straits for NATO to deny them to the USSR. Greek and Turkish forces should be oriented to a more defensive role designed to defend their own populations and territories. Both countries could opt for a mixed, sequential strategy of barrier defense followed by territorial defense in an unconventional warfare mode in enemy-occupied areas and defense of national redoubts in remote areas. Greek and Turkish conventional forces should similarly be restructured for defense in a localized conflict between themselves and the USSR. Such restructured forces could not defeat the Soviets, but just as in the Yugoslav case, by increasing the costs of occupation to the Soviets above present levels, they could have greater deterrent value than forces with the present configuration. For South Korea, a strategy of forward defense based upon barrier systems may prove to be the most advantageous means of resisting a Chinese invasion. South Korea's forward defense is not particularly vulnerable to penetration and envelopment (as in the case of Greece and Turkey) because of the mountainous

terrain, the limited Chinese/North Korean mechanized capabilities, and the narrowness of the Korean peninsula. In the cases of Burma and Thailand, both unconventional and conventional forces are required to defend the jungle and mountainous terrain barrier separating national population centers from China and to block egress from this barrier.

To prepare for subtheater conventional attack by Warsaw Pact minor powers, Greece and Turkey require that some of the light infantry occupying an anti-Soviet barrier defense system be deployed forward. To hedge against the contingency of Soviet forces joining the attack after Greek or Turkish forces have committed themselves forward of their barriers, these forces require strong antitank reserves. The matter is simpler with regard to South Korean involvement in subtheater conventional conflict; the optimum South Korean defense posture against Chinese attack is also the best way to counter a North Korean attack. The assumption that South Korea is militarily inferior to North Korea—which had generated a modernization program of \$1.5 billion for the South Korean forces—is not supported by critical analysis. Expanded numbers of light-infantry divisions, as used by the North Koreans and the Chinese, provide a recommended alternative to expensive modernization of the inapplicable U.S. military model.

In preparing against insurgency, and also in South and Southeast Asia against insurgency accompanied by external attack, military forces of Third World countries should have a supporting role; the primary role in counterinsurgency operations belongs to police and police-intelligence forces. Locally billeted military forces should help local police to cement governmental control of the countryside by providing active patrolling and ambush support functions. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the conventional military, constituted as a maneuverable light infantry, should block external invasion and prevent the enemy from operating in units large enough to defeat the many but widely dispersed paramilitary units.

Implementation of the Nixon Doctrine should also be reflected in new accounting practices showing the dollar costs and program objective of *all* forms of U.S. arms transfers more clearly than is presently the case. Grant aid is likely to decrease in the 1970s. Credit transactions, too, will often prove inconsistent with promoting self-reliance in the Third World. Cash sale of arms for hard currency at non-discounted prices, while tempting some countries to turn to suppliers other than the United States, would oblige Third World countries to assess their defense needs more carefully. At the same time, the United States should consider a new R&D program to adapt previously developed military equipment to the specific requirements of Third World countries. "Intermediate military technologies" could be refined as counterparts to labor-intensive civilian "intermediate technologies" suited to countries in early stages of industrialization.

To prepare for future crises in Third World countries, the United States should complement its regular aid programs with contingency planning to augment the defense potential of its friends—and of ex-Soviet clients seeking to sever their connection with the USSR—in a crisis. Training of military officers, both foreign and American, concerned with security assistance should be revamped. Although U.S. military service schools should continue to welcome foreign officers in order to increase professionalism and to promote favorable attitudes toward the United States on the part of foreign military elites, their training should not be limited to prevailing American military doctrine. Rather, it should seek to enhance their

desire for self-reliance while preparing them to act in future contingencies as the indigenous link with U.S. forces that might be sent to help them defend their country. If the Nixon Doctrine is to succeed, it will also be necessary to train a new category of U.S. military officers with deep knowledge of the military culture of specific foreign defense establishments.

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I. THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE

INTRODUCTION

Since the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine in July 1969, the United States Government has been reshaping its role in assisting the national security of the developing countries of the Third World. Responding to public sentiment, the Nixon Administration has sought to reduce the American military presence abroad without retreating into isolationism and without increasing the risk of new crises and conflicts. Thus far, however, analysts have differed, sometimes sharply, over the operational implications of the Nixon Doctrine for security assistance, alliances, and U.S. military requirements. That the debate continues suggests that there is still room for conceptual and analytical contributions.

This study examines the implications of the Nixon Doctrine for U.S. security-assistance programs in the Third World; the relevance to the Doctrine's implementation of the experiences of several Third World countries that have developed their own military doctrines and organizations; the military dimensions of security-assistance programs, particularly the advantages of force structures different from present ones; and the possibility of improving U.S. military relations with Third World countries through new strategies for training and materiel assistance.

Major policy changes such as the Nixon Doctrine are not always easily translated into clear operating concepts. Until their operational implication is established by practice, words can be interpreted in many different ways. Institutions tend to interpret terms that are meant to convey new ways of doing things so as to minimize the changes required in their operations. While such conservative propensities are necessary for the preservation of institutions, they make policy changes difficult to implement.

This problem manifests itself clearly in the way the key concepts of the Secretary of Defense's 1972 annual report¹ can be interpreted as revealing that the United States' perception of its role in world affairs has not changed significantly since the end of World War II. The first of those concepts, *total-force planning*, simply stated, means that the United States will use all available resources, including those of its allies, to deter threats by violence to U.S. interests. Formal alliances,

¹ *National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1973, February 1972, p. 23, hereinafter referred to as the 1972 Defense Report.*

the integration of "Free-World forces," and "combined force planning" are elements of the total-force idea. Superficially, little seems to distinguish this view of the U.S. contribution to Third World military needs from earlier efforts to promote defense pacts such as SEATO and CENTO, although it could also be interpreted as favoring mutual help without an excessively large, unilateral American contribution.

A second key concept in the 1972 Defense Report is *regionalism*. It differs from the total-force idea by downplaying direct U.S. participation in the defense of Third World countries, thereby placing a greater responsibility on U.S. allies and friends to look after their own and neighboring interests. Regionalism differs from the total-force approach in advocating U.S. security assistance that reduces the necessity for U.S. troops in foreign countries and encourages regional cooperation and alliances among Third World countries.

But a third key concept appears as a truly significant break with former views on Third World military problems. The 1972 Defense Report reiterates the Nixon Administration's stress on promoting self-reliance in, and augmenting the self-defense capabilities of, U.S. arms recipients. Security assistance is to be adapted to specific country needs, and the receiving country will be expected to provide at least the manpower for its defense, relying on the United States primarily for equipment and training, and not necessarily for an unlimited time.²

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Though the concepts of total-force planning and regionalism can thus be interpreted as a renewal of commitment to an old faith, the evidence suggests that the novel concept of Third World self-reliance will increasingly prevail as the guideline for U.S. international-security policy. The President, in his report to the Congress on U.S. foreign policy for the 1970s, stated:

The United States has shifted from the predominant role it played in the postwar period to a new role of accepting and encouraging initiative and leadership from our allies.³

Although that statement seems at first to refer primarily to our changing relations with major allies such as Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan, it also applies to the countries of the Third World, as is clearly expressed in the following paragraph:

In our relations with all countries we proceeded to give effect to our new policy of insisting that the United States has neither the prescriptions nor the resources for the solution of problems in which ours is not the prime national interest. It is coming to be widely understood that we are in earnest when we say that it is for others to formulate solutions to these problems, and that our contribution should be viewed as a supplement to the application of major resources from those primarily at interest.⁴

² Ibid., p. 51.

³ *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s—The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States*, February 9, 1972, p. 7.

⁴ Ibid., p. 9.

The U.S. contribution to the solution of U.S.-related Third World defense problems which is of course always under the scrutiny of the Executive, is now being called into greater question by the Congress than ever before. Frustrations generated by the foreign aid practices of almost a quarter of century; a new awareness that even the richest nation in the world requires most of its resources for its domestic needs; changed perceptions by the American people of external threats to the national security of the United States; recent tempering of the confrontations with the Soviet Union and with the People's Republic of China; and, most of all, the bitter legacy of the war in Indochina have converged to produce increasingly strong opposition to all forms of foreign aid. The Administration has viewed that opposition as a threat to U.S. security. Requests for military assistance for fiscal year 1973 have been increased, based in part on the argument that as the U.S. military presence abroad decreases, larger amounts of aid must be made available to strengthen Third World friends and allies.

This study does not suggest that present types and levels of security assistance must be maintained. On the contrary, it argues that by adapting doctrines and force structures, taking maximum advantage of each developing country's capabilities and realistically assessing the threats it might face, the security and self-reliance of Third World countries can be effectively promoted at lower cost to the United States. The President has identified a primary objective of U.S. security assistance as the fostering of self-reliance. This change of emphasis derives from the conclusion that the United States should not attempt to play indefinitely the predominant defense role in world affairs that it assumed after World War II. It has rarely proven of long-term benefit to our interests to have client states. But neither is it desirable that any countries remain or become the client states of other, potentially hostile, powers. American objectives are likely to be best served by the existence of a pluralistic global system of nations that are as self-reliant and independent as circumstances permit.

Obviously, no country, including the superpowers, is truly self-reliant in the rigorous sense of the word. All countries are part of an increasingly interdependent global system. They require resources from outside their borders and are affected by external actions over which they have little direct control. Nevertheless, the term self-reliant, which is central to this study, is far from meaningless. It indicates a national will to depend as little as possible on external decisions and resources in matters of national defense and internal security. A self-reliant nation, regardless of its internal social organization or ideology, intrinsically contributes to a world order congenial with U.S. interests. It does so not only by remaining independent of our potential enemies, but also by not being interested in becoming our client and thus a burdensome drain on our resources and often an albatross in the constantly changing international political community.

The changing view of the basis of our future relations with Third World nations makes it easy to understand that the presence of a national will to be self-reliant should be a major consideration in the future selection of countries deserving American security assistance. The President recognized that point—and also the necessity of helping deserving nations—in his 1972 report to the Congress:

The effectiveness of local deterrence and defense is, in the last analysis, measured by the will and effort of the threatened country. For unless a country mobilizes its own psychological, human, and material resources, our

assistance cannot be effective. Given that will and effort, however, our assistance can make the critical difference—to the security of the threatened nation and to world stability and peace.⁵

In this study we are trying to determine in just what ways American security assistance can make the critical difference to the defense of a threatened nation that is willing, or has the potential will, to resist subversion or attack with all the resources at its disposal. Not to be discounted, of course, is the fact that an element of all assistance, U.S. or other, is the development of a country's determination, confidence, and effort.

In exercising its dominant role during the last twenty-five years, the United States has fostered the creation of a variety of complex and delicate relationships with many countries and groups of countries in all parts of the world. Significant changes in American policies are likely to have at first a severe impact on countries that have dependence become accustomed to certain patterns of dependence on the United States. At worst, sudden changes could result in a rapid destabilization of the international system that has emerged in the aftermaths of World War II. The reshaping of U.S. military deployments and military assistance overseas will have to be done gradually and carefully to allow stabilizing adjustments.

The practical meaning of the Nixon Doctrine and the specific policies required to implement it do not spring spontaneously from the enunciated theory. They will have to be discovered and elaborated by a slow process of professional analysis and informed public debate. Though the 1972 Defense Report helps clarify the implications, it also reveals some of the difficulties raised by the new doctrine, leaves a number of questions unanswered, and fails to overcome certain contradictions between policies that are a legacy of the past and those that are a requirement of the future.

The Report gives the impression that it was thought necessary to avoid a drastic break with that past security policy based on the idea that the United States had to prepare for an ultimate military confrontation with the Communist world. Quoting the Defense Report of the previous year, the Secretary of Defense in 1972 reasserted our commitment to the concept of total-force planning:

In defense planning, the strategy of Realistic Deterrence emphasizes our need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of Free World security. These Free World military and related resources—which we call “Total Force”—include both active and reserve components of the U.S., those of our allies, and the additional military capabilities of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs.⁶

The 1972 Defense Report argues emphatically that the validity of the total-force planning concept may extend beyond the lifetime of the present generation into the distant future. Although other interpretations are possible, the obvious one is that the United States wants to retain its role as leader of a major coalition of nations

⁵ Ibid., p. 168.

⁶ *Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence*, Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on the Fiscal Year 1972-1976 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, before the House Armed Services Committee, March 9, 1971, p. 21.

but, at the same time, to reduce its paternalistic role. If that interpretation is correct, the change in U.S. foreign and security policies does not point toward pragmatic cooperation with any friendly country eager to enhance its self-reliance and maintain its independence and freedom of action, but toward the more limited purpose of redistributing burden-sharing among partners with common goals.⁷

THE TOTAL-FORCE CONCEPT AND THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

The importance of total-force planning on NATO's Central Front is self-evident. But it seems relevant to ask whether the states that have been termed forward-defense countries in official U.S. security assistance parlance, such as Greece and Turkey on NATO's Southern Flank,⁸ and Taiwan and South Korea on the periphery of the People's Republic of China, could in the future make contributions to the common defense commensurate with the cost of maintaining their present military establishments. This is not to diminish the relevance of any cost of defense when viewed in relation to self-preservation.

As fiscal and political constraints are likely to limit available resources, U.S. security assistance to forward-defense countries will probably be reduced during the 1970s. Lacking a breakthrough in their own resources, less expensive defense options will have to be found in order for those countries to deal with threats to their security. Funds for security assistance to forward-defense countries will also face competing demands from other friendly countries whose defense is of concern to the United States. Consequently, each country's program will have to be as efficiently and effectively designed as possible and costs will have to be kept to a minimum for the overall objectives of U.S. security assistance to be attained.

In the absence of severe crises it should not be necessary to increase military assistance to any Third World country. In fact, most U.S. security assistance programs must eventually be reduced. If new crisis programs have to be initiated, U.S. budgetary reallocations may be needed. That could require the shifting of funds from the more expensive U.S. security assistance programs of some forward-defense countries to other countries of more immediate concern. If—as will be argued in greater detail below—the defenses of the forward-defense countries are properly restructured, such changes in levels of assistance, whether of a planned or emergency nature, need not be catastrophic.

The military-assistance programs of the past twenty-five years have been the result of unique historical circumstances. Greece and Turkey became major recipients of American military assistance as part of the implementation of the Truman Doctrine, which in turn derived from the assessment that the Soviet Union intended to incorporate those two countries into its system of Eastern European satellites and, from there, to proceed to a major takeover in Europe. South Korea's defense

⁷ "The Total Force concept means nothing less than the maximum and integrated use of all our available resources—including those of our allies and friends. We must shed old parochial concepts of national security planning to meet global defense requirements for the future. Some of the decisions we will be making in the immediate years ahead will reach their optimum application in the 21st century." The 1972 Defense Report, p. 12.

⁸ Although Greece and Turkey are strategically and geographically NATO countries, their political, economic, and social characteristics make them part of the Third World.

was forced upon the United States by the Soviet-sponsored North Korean invasion of June 1950. The defense of Taiwan was assumed amidst apprehensions of Communist China generated by the Korean war. American involvement in Southeast Asia flowed from concern over the "domino theory"—a strong influence on strategic analysts after the French defeat in Indochina in 1954. In the global strategic perspective of the 1970s, those countries remain important to the United States, and the threats they face should be appreciated, but they are not necessarily more important to long-term U.S. interests than other countries, such as, for instance, Indonesia, whose self-reliance could be furthered with relatively small amounts of American resources, modest by comparison with past U.S. aid budgets for the forward-defense countries.⁹

As stated, total-force planning is clearly evident and valid for NATO's Central Front. It may also become valid for security arrangements between the United States, Australia, and Japan, if the latter decides to play a more active role in the Asian balance of power. But total-force planning is of doubtful utility for our relations with those developing nations lacking technological skills and an indigenous industrial base, particularly if it requires that they maintain a sophisticated military posture not geared to their most immediate needs and capabilities.

Most clashes that are likely to occur in the world in the 1970s would seem to fall in the category of what the 1972 Defense Report calls subtheater/localized threats. That category of conflict encompasses a multitude of possible adversary situations. With a nuclear parity existing between the United States and the Soviet Union, and with the current power constellation, in which the People's Republic of China enjoys enhanced recognition, none of those three countries is likely to become directly involved in subtheater conventional wars. But each may feel compelled by broader politico-military considerations to support various smaller countries engaged in such conflicts.

At this end of the spectrum of conflict in which the superpowers and other major powers may become only indirectly involved, future U.S. security assistance can have considerable leverage. This study seeks to identify ways in which American resources can be used most efficiently to enhance the defenses of any friendly country confronting a subtheater/localized threat. In view of the evolving international environment, it may be in the interest of the United States to review the level and composition of security assistance to forward-defense countries with the intent of moving toward more realistic programs in the future. The United States may thus be able to release resources for new beneficiaries committed to self-reliance or, more important, to have greater flexibility to respond to crisis situations.

REGIONALISM IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE

Both total-force planning and regionalism assume the existence of common defense interests of sufficient strength to bind a variety of countries not only with the United States but also with each other. In view of the tendency toward multipolarity and the weakening of traditional alliances in favor of a less predictable

⁹ Of course, Indonesia could also absorb large amounts of military assistance if its forces were to be equipped not only for defense of their own country but also for a regional security role.

balance of power, and in light of the persistence of rivalries and antagonisms between many U.S. security assistance recipients, the possible scope for applying total-force planning and regionalism in the Third World would seem to be limited at this time.

Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, for instance, SEATO is of nominal military value, being primarily a second signature affixed to the American defense commitment to Thailand and a rationale for certain coordination of the political and military efforts of some of the member countries. Even strongly anti-Communist countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, which have taken firm measures against internal subversion, do not want to be associated with SEATO because of the negative image it has carried from the beginning as a Cold War instrument of the United States. Partly to avoid the SEATO taint, but also guided by the calculation that the signing of formal security treaties would not be compatible with the claim of being independent and nonaligned, Indonesia has refused to participate in such treaties while being extremely active in creating a network of bilateral security relationships with its neighbors.

It would be an exaggeration to say that regionalism has no future in Southeast Asia. But the forms regionalism will take may be a subtle network of understandings more economic, political, and cultural than military, almost intangible and therefore difficult for the United States to support materially except in the form of coordinated bilateral programs with individual countries.

Near East and South Asia

In South Asia, the recent India-Pakistan war suggests that regionalism would be a nonstarter. Likewise in the Middle East and North Africa, few real opportunities for regional military cooperation seem to exist. The United States has persistently advocated regionalism in the Persian Gulf, in the hope that Iran and Saudi Arabia would cooperate to keep the Gulf free of a physical Soviet presence and radical ideologies, both of which might threaten the flow of oil to the Western world and to Japan.

The problem with promoting regionalism in the Persian Gulf is that it would require choosing one major power, Iran, to act as guardian of U.S. security and economic interests in the area. Since relations between Iran and the Arab states bordering the Gulf are not particularly warm, and Saudi Arabia and Iran are competitors in the international oil market, U.S. aid and arms to Iran could arouse suspicions among even the most moderate Arab regimes. Regionalism seems an unlikely arrangement in the Persian Gulf. Instead, the United States will probably find itself backing the strongest regional power, Iran, with the sale of large quantities of modern equipment, thereby possibly complicating U.S. ties to surrounding Arab countries. This may serve U.S. interests, but it cannot be termed a successful venture in regionalism.

South America ¹⁰

The political difficulties in selecting a regionally dominant country to receive security assistance with a view to promoting U.S. security objectives on a regional basis are also illustrated by our situation in South America. Brazil is strategically located, far enough away not to conflict directly with the United States over contiguous territories yet bordering on every South American country except Chile and Ecuador. Brazil is also the overwhelming political and military power of South America. Partly for those reasons and partly because Brazil is currently ruled by a military government that is both strongly anti-Communist and favorably disposed toward U.S. investors, some Brazilian elites expect favored treatment from the United States.

Brazil's very prominence, however, marks it as a target of suspicion among its Spanish-language neighbors and generates in those countries resistance to Brazilian claims to regional leadership. Special treatment for Brazil might appear to them to run counter to the carefully developed juridical equality among nations codified in the inter-American system, and could be criticized as associating the United States too closely with Brazil. Brazilian concern over instability in neighboring countries such as Uruguay (a concern that happens to coincide with American interests) has historically been viewed as a sign of Brazil's imperialism and desire for expansion at the cost of its neighbors.

Among Brazil's neighbors, Argentina has been quick to feel slighted by any hint of favored U.S. treatment of Brazil. In fact, Argentina has a history of seeking to unite the smaller Spanish-speaking countries against either U.S. or Brazilian hegemony. Within Brazil, sensitivity to charges of pro-Americanism may increase tendencies to prove Brazilian independence through the advocacy of anti-U.S. positions (such as Brazil's recent claim to 200-mile territorial waters). In the long run, U.S. use of Brazil as an intermediary might therefore lead to a *loss* of U.S. influence in Brazil. That danger could be lived with or offset in the face of a specific threat that seemed to warrant preferential treatment for Brazil. But such a threat does not seem to exist today, nor is a clear coincidence of U.S. and Brazilian security interests easily demonstrable.

Possible Applications of Regionalism

Despite the limitations on regionalism as a guideline for U.S. security assistance in the Third World, regional cooperation is not uniformly a vain hope. What is questionable is the United States' ability to promote regionalism in the absence of genuine mutual interests already linking nations together. Furthermore, there is the possibility that where indigenous regional cooperation exists, efforts by the United States to promote its own concept of regionalism may be counterproductive. The safest guideline would seem to be to allow local forces to take the lead in exploring the possibilities for regional cooperation in security matters, limiting the U.S. role primarily to bilateral consultation and assistance. The United States may also wish to consider the possibility of contributing to regional or international peacekeeping efforts, should circumstances allow such a role. That is quite different,

¹⁰ The authors are grateful to their colleague Luigi Einaudi for the paragraphs on South America.

however, from providing expensive assistance to regional powers in the hope that they will intervene militarily in behalf of U.S. security interests when the United States itself is reluctant to act. It is the latter implication of regionalism that seems least appropriate to the world of the 1970s.

Most countries of the Third World will concentrate their military efforts on self-defense. Only after achieving confidence in their own defenses can they consider contributing their resources to their neighbors' defense programs or involving themselves in regional-defense forces. If, in building their own defenses, Third World countries restructure their forces along the lines suggested in this study, they will have greater flexibility, less dependence on external logistics, and may be better able to aid other countries in their defensive operations. Conversely, they will accord greater flexibility to their U.S. associate.

SELF-RELIANCE: THE PRIMARY GOAL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

By helping to create self-reliant defense forces in friendly Third World countries, the United States would be raising the threshold at which direct American or other external intervention might be required. That must be traded off against a possible loss of political influence in those countries, but the extent of such U.S. leverage in the past has probably been exaggerated in many cases. Also not to be lost is the responsibility that accrues to the United States when such leverage is applied.

One way of encouraging self-reliance among recipients of military assistance is through the arms the United States Government makes available and through the training and advice it gives for organization, managerial know-how, doctrine, and strategy. A major problem in using arms transfers to foster self-reliance is that the U.S. military, drawing on its own experience, naturally tends to create abroad armed forces that are patterned after American forces. That often includes the provision of equipment, doctrine, and strategy, which places heavy logistic burdens on foreign military establishments. Foreign military planners themselves, many of whom have been influenced by Western training, want their defense establishments to be as modern as possible and, therefore, may demand the latest models of American equipment. Such propensities could increase defense spending dramatically or result in small amounts of showcase weaponry inadequate for realistically meeting military needs. "Modernization" of Third World countries' defense forces to reduce direct U.S. involvement may take the form of pouring in equipment and organizational techniques developed for U.S. forces. This can hinder rather than promote self-reliance. This kind of modernization not only hinders establishment of self-reliance but even prevents its development. The adoption of U.S. military doctrines, and consequently the related organization, equipment, and training, alienates a Third World nation from the defense realities and capabilities facing it. The consequence is inability to cope effectively with its primary security problems, which are generally in the field of insurgency. It will be argued later that, compared with restructuring defense postures, the American type of military modernization is an expensive means of enhancing security in Third World countries.

Promoting self-reliance through arms transfers calls for favoring military sys-

tems that use inexpensive, easily maintained arms, especially those that can eventually be locally produced. Instead of complex aircraft, artillery, and tracked vehicles, Third World countries need systems that effectively use cheaper aeronautical systems, ground force weapons, and mobility keyed to their own needs. That would mean the substitution of a broader-based light-infantry force and corresponding doctrines for the heavily mechanized systems designed for U.S. needs and for the Central Front in Europe. Besides reducing investment costs, that approach has the advantage of reducing logistics and maintenance problems, both of which normally consume a substantial part of any defense budget.

An important step in a nation's becoming self-reliant is the adoption of a military doctrine and a defense strategy that mobilize appropriate national resources for self-defense and internal security. Such doctrine and strategy are a necessary foundation for the organizational and equipment configurations that will promote self-reliance. But they presuppose the most important attribute of all, a government's and a people's desire to bear the main burden of their own defense out of national pride and a determination to remain independent. Doctrines of self-reliance have been most fully developed in the Third World in countries such as Yugoslavia and Indonesia, whose people have a background of experience and will that supports such a course of action. Parallels can also be found in a number of small European countries, namely Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland, although they are less relevant to the Third World because of their advanced industrial development and their exceptionally strong national spirit.

In organizational terms, self-reliance requires that a government faced with a threat to its security make a realistic effort to mobilize the population to defend itself. A variety of military and quasi-military means are possible. These range from developing home-defense forces to developing local militias, standing reserves of the regular army, and various other military organizations. Implied in all cases is the mustering of the economic resources of the nation. A threatened government that cannot exploit its total resources for its own defense presents a dilemma to any would-be assisting nation. An exhibition of self-reliance by threatened countries is clearly essential to the functioning of the Nixon Doctrine. If U.S. security assistance is meant to promote further self-reliance, one tangible sign of how well it is succeeding in a particular country might be the degree of involvement of the population and other resources in its national defense.

The Nixon Doctrine suggests that the United States should view favorably a country that has a declaratory policy of defending itself without major assistance from abroad. The United States should demonstrate that it prefers such a policy to one that constantly invokes alliance commitments as the backbone of its defense.

If national defense and internal security keyed to enhanced self-reliance become the primary backdrop to U.S. security assistance to Third World countries, substantial changes in current U.S. military assistance programs will be required. Shifts from the status quo, especially if they imply smaller amounts of aid to certain Third World friends, are bound to be unsettling and to incur some political costs in the short run. The United States may fear that as it reduces its contribution to the defense of Third World allies it may also lose influence in critical areas. Friendly regimes may be alienated, neutrality may replace pro-Western sentiments, and the "containment shield" around the USSR and China may be weakened. Some of those fears are warranted, but changes in the global power configuration will take place

regardless of the nature of U.S. assistance programs. Traditional alliance relationships are likely, in any event, to be eroded by Soviet policies of détente in certain areas and by a growing recognition that after Vietnam the United States will be reluctant to send troops abroad to defend any Third World country.¹¹ These facts need not, however, reduce intolerably the security of Third World countries, provided they take steps to restructure their armed forces and to adapt their operational doctrines to new realities. Less expensive and more self-reliant defense can still be good defense.

If the current climate continues, the Congress may well be disposed to reduce the high levels of aid that our Third World arms recipients, especially the forward-defense countries, have come to expect. Nations highly dependent on that aid would feel threatened by any sudden cutback, and their insecurity would affect bilateral relations. In contrast, a program installed now to progressively increase the self-reliance of arms recipients, eventually to the point where U.S. contributions would be quite modest, might, despite initial friction, be able to provide the former recipients of large amounts of aid with a degree of self-confidence and assurance that would make bilateral relations with the United States stable. If coupled with a consistent U.S. declaratory policy that aid in an emergency will most likely go to self-reliant countries, the modest military assistance programs that Congress is likely to approve in the future should be more effective in maintaining good relations with allies than the current vulnerable and tension-inducing programs.

U.S. arms transfers that stress relatively inexpensive, easily maintained equipment might confer a bonus in their effect on regional arms competition. If the United States ceases to provide Third World countries with sophisticated weapons for offensive operations, other regional powers may feel less compelled to acquire comparable weapons. Although at first some other countries such as France might meet the demand for such weapons on purely commercial terms, in the long run American abstention is likely to curtail regional arms races.

An assessment of the impact of changes in the security-assistance policy of the United States cannot be complete without taking into account possible new developments in Soviet military-assistance programs. In the past twenty-five years, the United States has been able to draw, for its security assistance to friendly countries, on the vast reservoir of materiel initially left from World War II and Korea, which were then returned to the inventory as the U.S. armed forces were modernized. That pool of resources has been gradually exhausted, and the Military Assistance Program (MAP) has had instead to draw on new procurement at increasingly high unit costs. In the future, constrained by likely budgetary limitations, the United States will be able to provide less and less military equipment to friendly countries.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union will continue to have large amounts of equipment available for military-assistance programs as it modernizes its own armed forces.¹²

¹¹ Already, Iran is purchasing Soviet equipment, and Turkey is cultivating better relations with the Soviet Union, despite their alliances with the United States and their dependence upon U.S. arms.

¹² To a certain extent Soviet programs will be constrained by the same factors restricting U.S. assistance. However, the Soviets have a major advantage relative to the United States. The Soviets' style of war attempts to saturate its opponents at critical points. Such a tactic requires quantities, not sophistication. Hence, the Soviets will be retaining large quantities of relatively cheap equipment as opposed to what appears to be ever-smaller quantities of increasingly sophisticated U.S. (and NATO) equipment. A corollary of the Soviet quest for numbers is their focus upon combat units at the expense of logistical tail and their large number of 160 line divisions with consequent equipment inventory.

Having already demonstrated, in its dealings with Egypt and India, that ideology does not pose an obstacle if military-assistance programs can yield strategic benefits, the Soviet Union can be expected to try to take advantage of various countries' desires to acquire military capabilities that the United States may be unable to provide in comparable quantities.¹³ It is probably unrealistic in the long run to count on the ideological hostility of Third World military establishments to Communist sources of supply, if the choice they face is between Soviet equipment and no equipment. There is a way out of this dilemma. If the military leaders of the Third World believe that the doctrines, strategies, and types and quantities of military equipment that they can obtain from the United States and other Western sources of supply satisfy their realistic security needs, then they will not be tempted to turn to the Soviet Union for them. That consideration is a powerful argument for the new security-assistance strategy advocated in this study. If Third World military establishments remain the mental captives of the doctrines and strategies that they acquired in the past from their defense relationship with the United States, but American aid no longer provides them the materiel that those doctrines and strategies demand, they are bound to be responsive to invitations to get it instead from the Soviet Union.

While that may seem paradoxical in view of the ultimate combat purpose of such equipment, it should be recognized that the institutional logic of a military establishment is not necessarily consistent, under conditions of equipment scarcity, with the strategic logic of the intended use of that equipment, especially if the country in question does not perceive an immediate danger from any specific source or if its likely threats are obscure or remote.

THE THIRD WORLD CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT: IS SELF-RELIANCE FEASIBLE?

Given the likelihood of continuing conflict in the Third World, is self-reliance a feasible goal of U.S. assistance programs? Secretary Laird's reports to Congress identify two types of conflict in the Third World. One, termed *theater conflict*, would involve Soviet or Chinese attacks on Third World countries. Turkey, Greece, South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia stand out as possible targets. Under the Nixon Doctrine, the United States will presumably remain willing to play a major role in deterring that type of conflict.

The second form of Third World hostilities, termed *subtheater conflict*, raises more complex questions. The Nixon Doctrine has identified two variants of sub-theater conflict. The first involves attacks by countries such as North Korea and North Vietnam on U.S. allies such as South Korea, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos,

¹³ Events in Egypt in mid-1972 suggest that the Soviets cannot be sure of gaining influence by providing arms. The Egyptians, probably, feeling frustrated by five years of no-war, no-peace with Israel, demanded more from the Soviets than could be provided—not just equipment but also a commitment to come to Egypt's defense if the conflict with Israel were to go badly. In these unusual circumstances, the Egyptians apparently preferred to oust the Soviet military presence, even at the price of reducing Egypt's armed capabilities. Soviet arms, however, will probably continue to flow to Egypt, but in smaller quantities than in the past. The lesson would seem to be that the Soviets are also discovering that it is difficult simultaneously to satisfy the appetite of arms clients and to foster self-reliance.

and Thailand. In those instances the Nixon Doctrine would favor the attacked country's defending itself without the aid of U.S. combat forces but would not preclude the involvement of American forces under special circumstances. The second consists of insurrections against established governments. In that case, the government involved would clearly be expected to deal with the insurgency on its own, with only materiel help from the United States.

To determine the appropriate form of assistance to a Third World nation, security planners will presumably assess that nation's existing threats and indigenous capabilities. On that basis they will choose one of three levels of assistance, identified in the 1972 Defense Report as *combined force planning*, *complementary force planning*, and *supplementary force planning*. Those terms reflect declining levels of direct U.S. participation and apparently correspond to the objectives of total-force planning, regionalism, and self-reliance, respectively.

The following figure depicts our analysis of official U.S. thinking on the objectives and means of security assistance. It suggests that some current defense concepts are likely to be more useful than others and should therefore receive more attention in the planning of security-assistance programs. The concepts of total-force planning and regionalism, as usually defined, seem least applicable in most Third World conflicts.

Between the two variants of subtheater conflict lies a spectrum of cases that are likely to pose difficult choices for U.S. policymakers and planners. Since many Third World conflicts will probably fall along that spectrum, some thought should be devoted to adapting U.S. security assistance to "intermediate" cases.

For example, in case of the outbreak of hostilities between a Soviet client such as Egypt, Syria, or Iraq and a friend of the United States such as Israel, Lebanon,

Objective	Level of Assistance	Likely Conflict	Degree of U.S. Involvement
Total force planning Regionalism	Combined force planning	Attack by USSR or PRC on U.S. friend or ally	Greatest
	Complementary force planning	Attack by a minor communist power or U.S. friend or ally Attack by Soviet client on U.S. friend or ally	
Self-reliance	Supplementary force planning	Conflict between U.S. friends or allies Communist-supported insurgency Soviet client-supported insurgency Home-grown insurgency	Least

Note: Lined area least relevant to Third World conflicts

Alignment of U.S. objectives, levels of security assistance,
and likely Third World conflicts, under the Nixon Doctrine

Jordan, or Kuwait, the role to be played by the United States, both for precrisis deterrence and crisis assistance, is ambiguous. The Nixon Doctrine offers no clear guidance for such conflicts other than to suggest that when U.S. interests are at stake some action may be taken. In that case, adherence to the principle of self-reliance would suggest that nations that make serious efforts to defend themselves contribute more to the stability of the international system than do nations that fail to make such efforts. Thus, it would be in the interest of the United States to help the former, not necessarily because of their geographic location, but because in global perspective a multiplicity of self-reliant countries serves our purpose of promoting the diffusion and balancing of power.

An even more perplexing form of Third World conflict would be that between two states with which the United States seeks to maintain friendly relations. The recent India-Pakistan war falls in that category.

Finally, there are insurgencies that enjoy the direct support of either the major Communist powers or their client states. Except for the general guideline of not involving U.S. ground forces in insurgencies, the Nixon Doctrine rightly does not offer specific guidance, leaving American options open.

It seems clear, however, that in guiding our response to many such "intermediate" conflicts, the principles of total-force planning and regionalism are of little help. More relevant is the concept of self-reliance. If U.S. security assistance is geared toward promoting the self-defense capabilities of Third World nations, the question of under what circumstances the United States might directly intervene militarily need not be answered in advance. Each friendly Third World country would be receiving help toward dealing with, and would be expected to handle, the entire range of possible threats facing it, except an all-out attack from a major Communist power.

II. DOCTRINES OF SELF-RELIANCE

In considering how the United States can foster self-reliance, it is useful to look at the defense doctrines devised by countries lacking the industrial base, fiscal resources, and general level of development necessary to sustain a large-scale, modern, professional army furnished with enough heavy and sophisticated weapons and equipment to have a significant defense potential against a superior power. Doctrines of territorial defense have been most fully developed by Yugoslavia and Indonesia and have stemmed, respectively, from the guerrilla experience of Tito's Partisans during World War II and from the Indonesian struggle for independence against the Dutch from 1946 to 1949.¹⁴

The continued adherence of both countries to the doctrine of territorial defense, which relies on combined guerrilla and frontal strategies and tactics carried out by a nucleus of regular professional soldiers and more numerous citizen-soldiers that can be rapidly mobilized in an emergency, has largely been dictated by necessity. In recent years, Yugoslavia and Indonesia either have not been able to obtain massive amounts of military assistance or have been unwilling to pay the political price of such assistance.

As a result, the two military establishments, especially their ground forces, have developed and refined concepts of defensive warfare. They rely on large numbers of lightly armed combatants (up to 10 percent of the total population), with the intent not of holding territory in the initial stages of an invasion but of ultimately bogging down the invader by making the continued occupation of the country too costly to be worthwhile.

Adherents of the doctrine of territorial defense are not in principle opposed to the use of modern heavy weapons. They simply assume that in the absence of such weapons, which they cannot afford to buy and do not expect to receive on concessional terms, they must nevertheless prepare the defense of their country.

The doctrine of territorial defense fosters a high degree of self-reliance—in striking contrast with the exigent military-assistance demands on the United States from countries such as Turkey, Thailand, and South Korea or on the Soviet Union

¹⁴ Algeria is another country with a history of guerrilla warfare that applied similar doctrines in its struggle for independence. Since gaining independence in 1962, however, Algeria has not faced serious military threats and has therefore not developed an original adaptation of the doctrine of territorial defense. For background, see William B. Quandt, *Algerian Military Development: The Professionalization of a Guerrilla Army*, The Rand Corporation, P-4792, March 1972.

from Egypt. Far from claiming that they cannot defend themselves without massive foreign military assistance, both Yugoslavia, which fears a possible Soviet attack, and Indonesia, which is concerned about a Chinese threat in the more distant future, express confidence in their capacity to defend themselves primarily with their own resources. That does not mean, of course, that the two countries would be unwilling to accept, on their terms, material assistance to improve the combat capability of their forces.

YUGOSLAV DOCTRINE AND ORGANIZATION: TOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE ¹⁵

A brief review of Yugoslav defense doctrine and organization will amplify and help substantiate the above generalizations. The shock of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 led Yugoslavia's leaders to conclude that their existing defense capabilities were inadequate to counter the Soviet threat. A renewed conventional military buildup like that of the early 1950s was out of the question for economic reasons. The decentralized political system of the late 1960s (reflecting the opposition of federal Yugoslavia's eight constituent republics and provinces to excessive concentration of power in Belgrade) also precluded the revival of a large-scale standing army. Massive foreign military assistance, such as Yugoslavia had received from the United States in the 1950s, was neither desired nor available. Even had Yugoslavia been able, economically and politically, to "afford" a large conventional force, Yugoslav military planners argued that it would be ill matched to the threat of a highly mobile Great Power (read Soviet) military establishment in the 1970s. They assumed that Yugoslavia would always be outmanned and outgunned and that the new threat posed by a highly mobile enemy required effective mobilization in hours, not weeks. On the other hand, the planners argued, a modern conventional army is ill equipped to control territory. Accepting those arguments, Yugoslavia's political leadership turned to the concept of total national defense and (its most important institutional ramification) to the formation in peacetime of a large territorial defense force (TDF)—territorial armies of citizen-soldiers organized by the republican political authorities.

The new doctrine, and the military organization and tactics designed to implement it, are still being worked out by Yugoslav political and military authorities. But the major features of Yugoslavia's new approach to defense are already established. Total national defense rests on the premises that (1) small and medium-size states must be self-reliant in defense if they are to maintain their sovereignty, and (2) they can successfully resist (and thus quite likely deter) external attack if they have the national will and the appropriate institutions to involve the entire citizenry in national defense. That is the philosophy underlying a provision in the Yugoslav constitution that expressly forbids military capitulation or surrender of territory under any circumstances. The prohibition is elaborated in the revised national defense law of 1969, which states that it is the right and duty of every

¹⁵ For additional details, see A. Ross Johnson, *Total National Defense in Yugoslavia*, The Rand Corporation, P-4746, December 1971 (itself a summary of a longer study).

citizen to participate in national defense and the right and duty of local political authorities "to organize total national defense and to command the battle directly," i.e., even in the absence of nationwide command and control.

Specifically, should Bulgaria or another neighbor attempt an incursion into Yugoslavia, it would be resisted by the standing army, the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). In the more likely event of a massive blitz attack led by the USSR, the YPA, employing frontal tactics but seeking to avoid large losses, would attempt to delay enemy penetration long enough for the country to carry out total mobilization. Thereafter, YPA units, withdrawing from border areas, would join with the TDF in waging active mobile defense in depth throughout the country, using combined and partisan tactics. Yugoslav military planners assert that this doctrine and organization could tie down a Soviet invasion force numbering up to two million. The Yugoslavs assume that, given the Central European balance of power, the enemy is most unlikely to deploy a force that large in Southeastern Europe.

The Territorial Defense Force

The national defense law of 1969 gave legal sanction to territorial-defense units created *ad hoc* in the fall of 1968. Legally and doctrinally coequal with the YPA, the TDF has subsequently expanded to a force of nearly one million, with a goal of three million (15 percent of the population) within the next few years. In building up the TDF, the main emphasis has been on company-size units at the commune (local) level, organized by the 500 urban and rural communal authorities according to standards drawn up at the republican level along broad federal guidelines. The TDF companies are intended for the defense of communal territory only. In addition, "defense units" have been organized in some 2000 large factories and other economic organizations (each of which is required, by law, to draw up peacetime and wartime plans for local defense). Factory defense units are to perform some civil-defense functions, to defend the plant in the event of direct assault, especially by airborne enemy troops, and to merge with the communal TDF if the factory is captured. Separate youth units have been organized in some areas. The republics have also formed larger (battalion-size), highly mobile TDF units capable of military operations throughout the respective republic. The formation of additional units of this type has been announced.

TDF units are subordinate to the newly established defense commands, staffed by reserve YPA officers, at the communal and republican levels. The communal commander is responsible to both the communal political authorities and the higher, republican territorial defense command. The republican commands have considerable autonomy; ultimately they are subordinate to the federal Supreme Command. Hence, the TDF is not part of the YPA chain of command; local TDF units fall under YPA tactical command only when engaged in joint operations with YPA units. If an entire Yugoslav republic should be overrun by the enemy, the republican defense command would assume control of all military units on its territory—YPA as well as TDF units. Drawing on their World War II experience, the Yugoslavs have constructed a command-and-control mechanism intended to insure that large-scale military resistance will continue even if the apex of the military command structure is destroyed.

Training for total national defense is carried on in communal training centers,

where reserve YPA officers instruct TDF units; active officers instruct the local command staff. TDF units are armed primarily with light antitank and antipersonnel weapons of indigenous manufacture, supplemented by heavier mobile antitank and antiaircraft weapons for the battalion-size units. Yugoslav military analysts look forward to the TDF's acquiring certain sophisticated weaponry (including infrared and laser targeting devices, sensors, and communications). But they stress the utility of even the obsolete weapons captured in World War II in the meantime. Currently, weapons are stored in mobilization centers, and personal equipment is kept at home, although dispersal of light weapons on the Swiss pattern is under consideration. The Yugoslavs claim that half the TDF can be mobilized in 3 to 6 hours.

The Role of the Yugoslav People's Army

Acceptance of total national defense in Yugoslavia has signified a profound change in the role of the regular armed forces. The YPA remains substantial in size but is no longer *the* Yugoslav military institution. It is now complemented by a larger TDF, which is not—even in wartime—subordinate to the YPA. On the other hand, Yugoslav doctrine does not call for the transformation of the YPA into a professional training corps for a single army of citizen-soldiers like that of Switzerland. As indicated by the scenarios mentioned above, the active YPA must be able on its own both to resist a limited incursion and to delay a massive attack long enough for the country to carry out total mobilization. In the latter case, if larger-unit combat fails to prevent further inroads, the YPA would break down into smaller units to wage predominately partisan warfare alongside the TDF.

The fundamental change in the YPA's role in national defense has given rise to specific changes in YPA organization. The YPA is now being reduced in size and is being turned into a more mobile, better-armed force. Though the Air Force (part of the unified YPA) may aspire to an air-defense role similar to that of the Swedish air force, with ultramodern fighters, that is recognized to exceed Yugoslavia's economic capabilities. Doctrinal as well as economic limitations have led the Navy to abandon plans to build a Mediterranean capability in favor of concentrating on coastal and island defense. The major goal of continued modernization of the YPA is the development of a modern mobile infantry, well armed with antitank and antiaircraft weapons. As in the past, most weapons will be of indigenous manufacture. At the same time, political and military leaders alike insist that it would be pointless for Yugoslavia to attempt to compete with a Great Power in tanks, aircraft, or other modern heavy weaponry. They also believe that weapon systems such as the F-5 fighter airplane are too complex for Yugoslavia's defense needs and that modernization of the YPA must not delay the arming of the TDF. The YPA reserve has been deemphasized; currently, 80 percent of the YPA conscripts are later assigned to the TDF. Military maneuvers now take the form of joint defense by YPA and TDF units against large-scale armored invasion and airborne assault. Some support functions have been transferred from the YPA to the TDF and the civilian sector. Total national defense was simulated on a mass scale for the first time in October 1971 in the "Freedom-71" maneuvers, which some foreign commentators considered an impressive practical demonstration of the concept.

Having appraised the strengths and weaknesses of a potential Soviet invasion force and having made a virtue of economic and political necessity, Yugoslavia is organizing its entire able-bodied population for total national defense as the most effective way to deter an external threat. Though it incorporates aspects of the Yugoslav Communists' World War II Partisan experience, total national defense represents more than a nostalgic revival of successes of twenty-five years ago. It is an effort to apply principles of "people's war" (which Tito pioneered no less than did Mao, Giap, or Guevara) to a consolidated, semi-industrialized state faced with the possibility of attack by a much stronger external enemy, taking into account domestic and international political and economic realities and the available military technology.

Yugoslav defense doctrine and organization seek to deter Soviet military invasion or political pressure by demonstrating that a Czechoslovak-like road march through Yugoslavia by the Warsaw Pact will not be possible; that an occupation effort would be bloody, prolonged, and very costly in manpower and materiel; and that by transforming a Soviet invasion into a protracted conflict with its own forces, Yugoslavia could then successfully seek materiel assistance from the United States and Western Europe.

INDONESIAN DOCTRINE: TERRITORIAL WARFARE AND TERRITORIAL MANAGEMENT ¹⁶

Since its creation in 1946, the Indonesian Army has had an unbroken record of successes in counterinsurgency operations. All rebellions against the central government have been crushed, although in some instances only after years of fighting and substantial losses. The evolution of the Army's doctrine during the last decade has been marked by considerable intellectual activity in high military circles in refining concepts and methods and adapting to changing domestic and international political circumstances.

Indonesian officers have never paid homage to the military writings of Mao Tse-tung or Vo Nguyen Giap, despite some striking similarities between Indonesian and Asian Communist military doctrines. In fact, the Indonesians claim that when their ideas were taking shape, they were not familiar with Communist doctrines of guerrilla warfare. By contrast, they readily admit that cross-fertilization has resulted from exchanges of views with the Yugoslav military, whose doctrine—derived from parallel experiences—strengthened and confirmed their own views. Besides doctrinal similarities, the Indonesians' affinity for the Yugoslavs may also owe to the fact that the latter are considered nonaligned members of the Third World.

The Indonesian doctrine may be relevant for many countries wishing to achieve self-reliance, not only because it has repeatedly passed the pragmatic test of success in counterinsurgency operations, but also because from its earliest days the Indonesian Army has genuinely sought self-reliance. Indonesian military quote frequently an early message of the first Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces,

¹⁶ For an extended early treatment, see Guy J. Pauker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*, The Rand Corporation, RM-3312-PR, November 1963.

the late General Sudirman, who told them at the beginning of their struggle for independence, in 1945: "Always believe in our strength and never surrender to anyone who wants to recolonize us!" Indonesian military consider this attitude the basic principle of the system of territorial defense.¹⁷ Then, in mid-1951, General A. H. Nasution, at that time Army Chief of Staff, in drafting "The Basic Lines of the Program for the Development of the Army," wrote:

We will rely only on our own forces in carrying out our independent policy. Bear in mind that any enemy who attacks us will have an organization more modern than ours, that in our geographic position as an island nation we are very weak, and that we will be unable to develop completely modern armed forces within the next few years. But with spirit as our main asset we will tire out any aggressor in a long and widespread guerrilla war, a war which will finally reach a stage at which we will be stronger than they.¹⁸

The Army's quest for self-reliance has been fraught with difficulties. Between 1951 and 1958 it was caught up in a power struggle between various civilian political groups, which tried to use and shape the Army to their ends. Besides civil-military problems, the Army also suffered the consequences of efforts to modernize and professionalize itself. Many officers were sent to military service schools in the United States and other Western countries, from which they returned with perhaps excessive respect for Western military doctrines. In the wake of some less successful counterinsurgency operations, a Committee on Army Doctrine was created. It emphasized in late 1958 that the Army could be successful in counterinsurgency operations (or against external attack) only if it had the wholehearted support of the civilian population, especially in the countryside.

Actually, since the beginning of the counterinsurgency operations, which started for the Siliwangi Division as soon as it took over as the controlling force in West Java in late 1949 from the Dutch forces (where formerly the Siliwangi was fighting as the guerrilla force against the Dutch and the Darul Islam forces), the Army felt the necessity of support from the population in fighting and annihilating the guerrilla forces of the Darul Islam. This belief was the product of its experience as a guerrilla force. The 1958 report was only the formalized expression of a conviction and an attitude that already existed among unit commanders, but was now emphasized for use throughout the Army. The general principles were also further elaborated on specific tactical matters, such as the use of field artillery.

The conclusion was that the Army had to become active in all governmental and administrative operations to secure popular political support. As a principle, continually developed and refined since 1958, that conclusion underlies the Indonesian Army's assertion of a dual function in the life of the country—a *combat* role against external and internal enemies of the state and a *political* role as protector of the nation's integrity against interests and values that jeopardize its material and spiritual growth and well-being. In Indonesian doctrine, national defense and security operations using guerrilla methods ("territorial warfare") are logically linked with political operations aimed at securing popular support for the Army-backed government ("territorial management").

¹⁷ A. H. Nasution, *Towards a People's Army*, Delegasi, Djakarta, 1964, p. 42 (published in English).

¹⁸ A. H. Nasution, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia [The Indonesian National Army]*, Vol. I, Jajasan Pustaka Militer, Djakarta, 1956, p. 37.

That is in sharp contrast to the role of the military in Yugoslavia. Liberalization notwithstanding, politics in Yugoslavia remains the monopoly of the Communist Party. Although lately divided internally by regional and national conflicts, the Party refuses to tolerate organized opposition. In the past few years, Yugoslav military figures have voiced a concern that mounting domestic tensions in Yugoslavia, if unchecked, could sap the country's defense capacity. But the Party retains institutional control over the Army and thus has political responsibility for total national defense. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it demonstrated its continued capacity to mobilize the Yugoslav population for defense.

The Indonesian Army has felt impelled to assume a dual function because in Indonesia politics is an arena of intense competition between many conflicting interest groups, whose activities tend to divide the population into antagonistic factions. The Army sees no instrument but itself to integrate and solidify the nation and is convinced that party politics have to be bypassed to gain popular support for the government.

There may be some Third World countries in which a civilian bureaucracy dominates as it does in Yugoslavia, but in most, the political situation is more akin to that of Indonesia. Thus, Indonesian doctrine, which emphasizes not only military methods of defense but the necessity for sophisticated handling of civil-military relations, seems more relevant to the operational implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, although the Yugoslavs, because they receive no external assistance whatsoever and face a more immediate external threat than the Indonesians, may exemplify in purer form the value and potential of self-reliance.

By the end of 1960, Indonesia's highest policymaking body, the People's Provisional Representative Assembly (MPRS), had ratified the adoption of the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare. The Army then proceeded to develop operational guidelines at its Staff and Command School (SESKOAD) in Bandung. Under the leadership of the late Lt. Gen. Soewarto, that school, which had been for a number of years the military's intellectual powerhouse, became also a center for the indoctrination of numerous senior military and civilian officials in national security and its social, political, and economic prerequisites.

The late President Soekarno had actively fostered the Communist Party of Indonesia since at least 1959. In the next few years, in order to weaken the Army, which was the strongest and most determined anti-Communist force in the country, he built up the Indonesian Air Force and Navy as pro-Communist services, with the aid of a massive Soviet military assistance program. His political manipulations compounded normal interservice rivalries and led to the proliferation of competing doctrines of national defense and security emanating from the various services.

The aborted Communist coup of September 30, 1965, resulted eventually in the replacement of Soekarno by General Soeharto as President of Indonesia and gave the Army unchallenged dominance in the nation's political life. The Department of Defense then made vigorous efforts to integrate the armed services organizationally and to unify their defense doctrines. At a defense and security seminar held in Djakarta in November 1966 a new armed forces doctrine was developed that is still in force.

Like the Army's 1960 Doctrine of Territorial Warfare, the Armed Forces' 1966 Doctrine of National Defense and Security is not an easily comprehensible document, especially in translation. Although the ideas themselves are essentially sound

and hardheaded, they are presented in an elaborately symbolic way, a characteristic of much contemporary Indonesian political discourse.

The defense task of the armed forces is defined as the development of "total people's defense," involving close cooperation between the military and the people, with the assistance of the veterans' organizations dispersed among the civilian population, and of two paramilitary youth organizations found notably in the countryside (which are being trained in teamwork and discipline rather than in the handling of firearms). These two groups, called the Civil Defense Corps (which was transferred in August 1972 from the Department of Defense to the Department of the Interior) and the People's Resistance Corps, are intended, respectively, as local forces to help their own communities in cases of natural disasters or of warfare and to assist the regular forces in territorial defense. Both serve also as a general reservoir for military reserves. The reserve function is particularly important in a country that cannot afford universal military service and is therefore unable to train all able-bodied young men in regular military units in preparation for partial or general mobilization.

In the other aspect of their dual function, the armed forces participate in the making and implementation of state policies in all other sectors of public life. This role is codified as The Struggle Doctrine of the Armed Forces, formulated in 1966, which designates the military a "functional group" to be represented in the Cabinet, the central and local administrative services, the legislature, the foreign service, and other civilian public bodies.

Most military men serving civilian functions in the public sector are still on active duty and may be reassigned to purely military positions. They are under the authority of a special staff in the Department of Defense and Security. In October 1969, to clarify lines of authority and further the integration of the armed services (and to tighten the Army's control over its erstwhile rival services), the Defense Department was reorganized and the position of Chief of Staff for Functional Affairs was created. Even retired military personnel in civilian positions get direction in the performance of their jobs from the Department of Defense. That testifies to the strength of the military's *esprit de corps* and to the recognition that group solidarity is in the self-interest of each military man.

The Indonesian doctrine places equal emphasis on "technological weapon systems" and "sociopolitical weapon systems." Physical combat and the application of firepower are considered insufficient. A parallel effort must be made, through policies that appeal to people's interests and values, to induce motivation and influence behavior, in effect, to mentally mobilize the Indonesian people to impose their will on the enemy.

Like the Yugoslavs, the Indonesians consider the determination never to surrender paramount in territorial defense. Good military relations with the population, important under all circumstances, are indispensable in adversity. Only with popular support can troops on the defensive disperse and adopt guerrilla tactics to recoup their losses and attempt a comeback. For that reason alone, territorial management, or the cultivation of good military relations with the population, is a *sine qua non* of territorial defense.

Another major concept of the Indonesian doctrine, repeatedly stressed by Presi-

dent Soeharto in his speeches, concerns the defense potential of the nation. "National resilience" or "national tenacity" are ordinarily used to translate the Indonesian term, which stresses the will to maintain and mobilize all national resources for self-defense. The defense of a nation against subversion or external attack is believed to depend on the conjunction of a number of forces, including the will to fight, economic potential, administrative capabilities, and self-reliance, defined as "the ability to surmount disturbances and threats by one's own strength."

The task of the government and of the armed forces is thus to increase "national resilience" and to develop the capacity to mobilize all forms of national strength or power in response to any threat to the nation. Fulfilling that task requires an ideology, domestic and foreign policies, economic and cultural policies, and a military establishment that suit the national character.

The National Defense Institute of the Indonesian Armed Forces is responsible for elaborating the concept and operational meaning of "national resilience." In practice, that translates into promoting unity, because centrifugal forces and factionalism are still seen as a serious threat by the Indonesian leadership.

The most important organizational consequence of current Indonesian defense doctrine has been the establishment of a territorial military structure that parallels and supports the civil administration of the country, from the provincial level down to the village level. Operating alongside and in close cooperation with their civilian counterparts, the territorial military units assure the comprehensive garrisoning of the country and the permanent availability of troops for field-police-type, internal-security operations. Besides territorial units there are also mobile troops, of which a small part are assigned to the National Strategic Command, which is a quick-reaction force at the national level. The other mobile military units are quick-reaction forces at the local or regional level, which can be used either to strengthen locally the territorial forces or nationally to augment the National Strategic Command. But the territorial troops form the framework of the territorial defense concept.

The Indonesian Armed Forces are being modernized with the help of a modest American MAP, which aims at giving them some strategic mobility. This program is a good illustration of the influence of the doctrine of territorial defense on MAP requirements. American assistance to Indonesia did not include military hardware before FY 1971, when about \$18 million in equipment, maintenance, and training was made available. The following year, FY 1972, the program was increased to about \$25 million, and in April 1972 the Administration requested \$29.9 million for FY 1973. Indonesia's self-reliance is reflected in the fact that the FY-1972 MAP amounts to less than 10 percent of the total resources required to support the Indonesian Armed Forces. Furthermore, the United States has not been asked for sophisticated military equipment; the Indonesian Department of Defense spends only a nominal amount for the purchase of military hardware; and the sophisticated Soviet equipment acquired in the early 1960s, which burdened Indonesia with a considerable debt, is being phased out of the inventory, to be replaced by different, simpler, and cheaper systems that are considered more suitable for the immediate needs of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

TOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE: SOME ANALOGUES IN ADVANCED NATIONS

Doctrines of self-reliance developed in semi- and less-developed countries have some points in common with (although they were not consciously derived from) the long-standing "armed neutrality" of several industrialized neutral European states, especially Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Israel must also be mentioned in this context. The advanced economic level of those states allows them to manufacture or purchase heavy, sophisticated weaponry. Sweden, the most highly developed European neutral country, has a first-rate air force. At the same time, Swedish defense doctrine, like that of Yugoslavia, aims at raising the cost of attempted occupation of the country to such an extent that it will deter even frontal assault by a Great Power. The similarities in defense doctrine and organization in the neutral European states, on the one hand, and in such less-developed countries as Indonesia and Yugoslavia, on the other, suggest that self-reliance for defense is not a function of economic backwardness but may have more general applicability.

The Swiss approach to defense¹⁹ embodies the militia principle, which allows Switzerland to mobilize a very large force in an emergency while maintaining the smallest European national force, after Luxembourg and Eire, in peacetime. Indeed, except in times of crisis, the army is prohibited by the Swiss constitution from having either standing troops or a commander in chief, and it is administered by civilian national authorities. The majority of those fulfilling service obligations at any one time, except under mobilization, are conscripts undergoing training (17,000 in the ground forces and 7,000 in the air and antiaircraft forces). The army has 2,500 regular cadre (professional soldiers) and the air force and air defense troops, which are organizationally an integral part of the army, have 3,000 additional regular cadre. Although the Swiss militia concept radically minimizes standing professional military forces, the nation can mobilize 600,000 reservists within 48 hours. That number represents almost 10 percent of the total population.²⁰

In the early 1960s, Switzerland decided that its traditional system of static defense, based on geography and manpower, was no longer feasible, since troop concentrations, fortifications, and airfields had become vulnerable to modern weaponry. Legislation of 1961 marked (1) the renunciation of the "redoubt" concept (carrying on resistance from an Alpine retreat) in favor of opposing the enemy everywhere on Swiss territory, and (2) the introduction of militia divisions, containing motorized infantry regiments, that were no longer intended solely for support of the infantry, but also for combat in their own right or for reconnaissance and antitank missions in the Swiss interior.

Swiss defense doctrine now postulates the use of mobile units with heavy firepower and partisan groups for local defense. Hence, elements of the militia principle have been reassessed for their application to paramilitary and civilian support of the key mechanized units. Within the army itself, the realization that the effects of modern warfare are not limited to the area of the "front" led to the creation of the

¹⁹ The authors are grateful to their former colleague, Margaret Carpenter, for the paragraphs on Switzerland. The figures are based on *The Military Balance 1972-1973*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1972.

²⁰ Similarly, Sweden and Finland can mobilize about 10 percent of their populations for defense on a militia or territorial basis in a day or two.

Territorial Service Organization (TSO). The TSO was designed to help coordinate efforts between local military personnel and cantonal authorities for civil defense and war economy. The TSO's dual purpose is to defend the civilian population behind the main lines and to relieve the field army and border guards of subsidiary tasks. Its basic unit is the *Ortwehr*, a local "army" constituted by cantonal authorities of men who still have military obligations to fulfill but are not needed for regular militia units. Like Yugoslavia after 1968, Switzerland has abandoned trying to spare the civilian population through mass evacuation of the vulnerable central plateau to the more protected Alpine region. Instead, Swiss planners have increasingly stressed the need for *local* territorial and civil defense.

Total national defense seems to be well suited to Switzerland's needs as a small, neutral state unwilling to accept the expense of nuclear weapons. The combination of local territorial-defense units and independent mobile-combat groups permits a range of defensive techniques for the protection of the entire country that would normally be feasible only with a huge standing army equipped with highly destructive weapons. Such strategic flexibility also enhances the possibility of defending or securing a maximum amount of national territory even if an adversary gains a foothold in the country.

Israel is frequently pointed to as a model of self-reliance in national defense. Three times in twenty-five years the Israelis have fought and defeated their Arab neighbors. The first time, in 1947-1948, it was in unconventional fighting against poorly organized Arab armies. Foreign arms contributed to the Israeli success, but the victory was primarily a result of intelligence, improvisation, and good fortune. By the time of Israel's second war in 1956, a regular professional army existed, but victory owed as much to coordination with British and French forces as to the superiority of Israeli tactics and fighting ability.

The Six-Day War of June 1967 stands out as a more impressive example of Israeli self-reliance in combat. Without direct outside assistance, Israel was able to launch an effective surprise attack that destroyed the Arab air forces within hours. Having seized the initiative, the Israelis went on to defeat the armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in short order. The key elements in Israel's rapid victory were its ability to mobilize an army of nearly 300,000 men in a short period; its extraordinary efficiency in the use of airpower and tanks; its tactics, which emphasized surprise, mobility, and deception; and not least, its adaptation to the character of its opponents.

Israel consistently maintains that it does not want foreign soldiers to fight for Israel. Israeli manpower can be supplied to meet virtually any conceivable Arab threat through a mobilization system that can add 250,000 soldiers to Israel's standing army on very short notice. This capability, like that of Switzerland, requires careful training, a deep commitment by the people to the defense of their country, and a very highly developed civic sense.

Most countries of the Third World will not be able to duplicate the Israeli mobilization system for their own defenses because their lower levels of political and economic development impede effective social organization. The Israeli ability to use equipment efficiently in a special and predictable environment is of more relevance to Third World defense problems. From their experience in desert warfare, the Israelis have learned to adapt equipment from a wide variety of sources to their special needs. They neither use the equipment in conventional ways, nor do they

hesitate to modify its characteristics to suit their defense doctrine and tactics. In addition, equipment, though stored, is kept at a very high level of readiness. Recently, the Israelis have been augmenting their military capabilities with extremely sophisticated and expensive equipment, much of which would be inappropriate in Third World countries. But the lesson that equipment can be altered and adapted to special environments is clearly an important one for all countries, even if they must rely on others to make the adaptations for them.

On balance, the Israeli system must be judged as having marginal relevance to Third World countries. It is not an inexpensive means of self-defense. To work properly, the system requires a highly educated and motivated population. It is primarily oriented to the offense. And it is best suited to a type of war that few, if any, Third World countries are likely to face in the near future. In adapting their equipment and its uses, however, the Israelis have set very high standards not only for developing countries but also for the industrialized West.

III. REVISING THIRD WORLD DEFENSES

In implementing the Nixon Doctrine with regard to military assistance, U.S. policymakers will need to take a hard look at the principles currently guiding MAP aid. One of them, at least, seems inconsistent with the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine. It is the practice of modeling MAP-recipient military forces after the doctrines and organization of the U.S. armed forces. Reliance on that model has led to the prescription of ill-suited military strategies and high-cost military postures for recipient countries. Rather than being guided by a more-or-less standard strategy and an all-purpose posture²¹ copied from U.S. practice, strategies and force postures for Third World countries should be tailored to their special, individual circumstances. This section diagnoses in some detail the fundamental problem of excessive reliance on the U.S. model and suggests alternative concepts of force structure and strategy for Third World countries, particularly forward-defense countries,²² that promise to be (1) more appropriate to the likely threats facing those countries, (2) of lower cost to the United States in military assistance, and (3) more in accord with the Nixon Doctrine.

Military strategies and concepts that may be valid in one period can lose their rationale as underlying conditions change. Unless concepts are constantly reviewed, dangerous time lags are likely to develop between the challenge and the response. Current military strategies and military-assistance programs largely derive from the political world of the late 1940s and early 1950s and the U.S. military experiences of World War II and Korea. U.S. military strategy and military-assistance programs for forward-defense countries have been geared primarily to a classic, nation-in-arms conflict relying upon economic potential, military expansion, and projection of an offensive capability. Thus, the strategy and posture pursued by the United States in the Third World are ill-suited for coping with the spectrum of likely

²¹ "Posture" and "structure" are used interchangeably in this section. While often used in the literature to mean level of forces or the *mix* of organizational "building blocks," here they refer to the specific composition of the force, including the design and equipping of the building blocks.

²² Besides Greece, Turkey, Korea, and Taiwan (formally designated forward-defense countries), Pakistan, Thailand, and South Vietnam can also be included in this category. These countries, plus Cambodia, were earmarked to receive 75 percent of the \$4.8 billion in program requests for security-related assistance. More than one-third of the remaining 25 percent is designated for Israel. Thus, the great bulk of recipient countries receive little more than 15 percent of all security-related assistance. *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., June 10, 11, 14, 1971*, pp. 381-385.

threats, such as high-tempo Soviet-style armored and heliborne attack or, at the other end of the spectrum, insurgency warfare.²³

THE PROBLEM OF COPYING THE U.S. MODEL

Some analysts have long realized that many MAP difficulties are somehow related to MAP's tendency to support mirror-imaging of U.S. military doctrine and organization. But they have limited their criticism to logistical redundancy and unnecessarily sophisticated equipment, failing to see—at least until very recently—that the problem involves the whole American concept of warfare in the post-World War II era.²⁴ MAP's critics have not questioned the basic military strategies and warfighting philosophies underlying the assistance program. For the forward-defense countries, the basic premises have been:

1. Countries exposed to Communist attack should be capable of denying the immediate Communist objective long enough for U.S. support to arrive.
2. Common equipment, doctrine, and communication and staff procedures mean more effective combined (i.e., multinational) action. They also alleviate interallied command problems, promote efficient training, and reduce the logistical complications of maintaining equipment of diverse national origin.

Those premises have formed the basis of a strategy of conventional defense and of an allied order of battle based on U.S. organizational and doctrinal principles. The reasoning behind them was straightforward and appears plausible. It assumed that because the United States, with its superior economic base, possessed a mobilization capacity exceeding that of the Communists, the United States would ultimately prevail. Recipient countries only had to be given enough defensive capacity to stave off the enemy until U.S. forces could be mobilized and combined with indigenous forces and a counteroffensive launched to push back the aggressor. This formula, successful in two world wars and, in a qualified sense, in Korea, required allied forces that were designed for combined operations. A force posture based on a U.S. model met that criterion. Since threatened countries generally depended upon U.S. reinforcement, and U.S. forces could not be adapted to fit the many national contexts in which they might be compelled to fight, it seemed to follow that foreign forces would have to adapt to the American model in order to mesh with American forces during a crisis.

On a more technical level, U.S. organizational structure was thought to be

²³ For a discussion of the constraints imposed on NATO by an inappropriate military structure, see Steven L. Canby, *NATO and Soviet Military Policy: Obtaining Conventional Comparability with the Warsaw Pact*, The Rand Corporation, R-1088-ARPA, September 1972.

²⁴ Criticism of MAP (other than that on political grounds) has been directed mainly at (1) habituating foreign troops to living conditions comparable to those of U.S. troops, (2) exporting unnecessarily sophisticated equipment to Third World countries, and (3) managerial and bureaucratic inefficiency. The second criticism relates to the "dumping" thesis, which is a rationalization of why client militaries are overburdened with inappropriate, sophisticated equipment. It asserts that to justify the purchase of new equipment for themselves, the U.S. military services have foisted off used, overly sophisticated equipment on client military establishments.

appropriate because it had been successful in the past, and if weapons and equipment were to be primarily American, U.S. structure would naturally be the most appropriate organizational framework. The result was that MAP recipients followed the U.S. pattern closely in combat units, while supporting forces were trimmed somewhat because of lower local living standards and because indigenous forces were not thought to need the full mobility of U.S. forces. The Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) differences between U.S. and MAP forces were thought to be in secondary weapons, communications, vehicles, and strength of supporting units.

The specific organizational form adopted by recipient countries (even for counterinsurgency²⁵) was the infantry division—the base unit of the U.S. Army. It is a heavy, all-purpose unit designed originally for infantry warfare in Europe.²⁶ That division, according to American doctrine, with appropriate support is capable of sustained offensive deployment in a wide range of geographic settings and against many types of threats.²⁷

²⁵ The modeling of counterinsurgency forces upon a common infantry division is consistent with the classic military view that the armed forces must cope with overt threats while other agencies deal with covert and potential threats. Thus, even when organizing forces against insurgency, MAP has followed army doctrine and geared its recipients to the big war, as was done in Vietnam:

Counterinsurgency operations are concerned with those situations ranging from subversive activities, which are only a potential threat, to situations when insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of established authority. It is in this latter situation, commonly called Phase III of Insurgency, that conventionally organized divisions and their assigned units may be committed. (U.S. Department of the Army, *The Division*, FM-61-100, June 1965, p. 149.)

This orientation requires large supporting forces relative to infantry. In Vietnam, during the period of greatest American involvement, less than 10 percent of the U.S. in-country strength was actually in rifle platoons (assuming full-strength platoons without R&R, sick leave, etc.). Such policies account in part for the well-known rule of thumb that regular forces must outnumber insurgent forces by at least ten to one.

²⁶ Though the infantry division has gone through numerous faceliftings, its essential character was set in the 1939-1940 reorganization of the U.S. Army, which was explicitly based on the French system then in vogue. The dominant personality behind that reorganization was Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, who was a firm believer in infantry predominance and in streamlining of forces. Extensive field testing in 1937-1938 led him to recommend a streamlined, triangular infantry division closely resembling the highly regarded French model, departing only in a reduced emphasis on tanks and antitank means. The division that finally emerged in 1939-1940 was considerably larger than the one recommended by General McNair, particularly in the realm of support. During World War II, moreover, field commanders' preferences for ever larger units were honored, and most tanks were parceled out to infantry divisions in 1944. Although the United States maintained a higher ratio of armored to infantry divisions in Europe than did the Germans (26 percent versus 18 percent, respectively), the U.S. military system remained philosophically wedded to the preeminence of infantry. Not only were most tanks frittered away in infantry support, but the armored division formed the largest U.S. armor grouping (in contrast to the German and Soviet practice of grouping tank armies) and was generally assigned on the basis of 1 armored and 3 infantry divisions per corps (as are the formations still used in the U.S. Army's school system). The army literature of the period reveals much of the debate over the organization of American forces. The best single source is *The U.S. Army in World War II: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1947. Another source of note is Thomas R. Phillips, "Traditionalism and Military Defeat," *Infantry Journal*, March 1941.

²⁷ These requirements lead to a large teeth-to-tail ratio. For example, in U.S. mechanized and armored divisions, only 23 percent of the men are actually in combat-maneuver platoons (infantry, tank, reconnaissance/cavalry, and antitank) as opposed to 32 percent for the comparable (though proportionately heavier in tanks) Soviet motorized rifle and tank divisions. Moreover, while the total U.S. division slice (division plus its share of nondivisional forces) is now 42,000 for the Seventh Army in Germany, the adjusted Soviet slice for East Germany for the same number of men in maneuver platoons is only 19,000. (A characteristic of Soviet forces is their paucity of nondivisional supporting units. For some types of units, such as trucking and medical, the Soviets rely on mobilized civil organizations. Other nondivisional units, such as artillery, ordnance, chemical, signal, specialized military maintenance, etc., do not exist except in the Soviet active forces.) The expectation of wide geographic deployment has also led to procuring complex equipment suitable for extremes of climate and terrain.

The emphasis on common equipment, doctrine, and procedures for allied nations has been reinforced by the "all-purpose" ideal that has been built into American military organizations and that has led to commonality within each service. The design of U.S. divisions for offense is understandable from a strategic point of view. As Army doctrine states:

The mission of the division is the destruction of enemy forces and the seizure or domination of critical land areas, their population, and resources.²⁸

That mission, derived from the military maxim that the best defense is a good offense, drives the organization and tactical deployment of U.S. units. Concentration on offense against other formal armies has led to the belief that combat can be reduced to four simple functions: find, fix, fight, and finish.²⁹ The body of doctrine derived to implement those functions is thought to apply to all types of operation.³⁰ Hence, doctrine is similar for all divisions (armored, airmobile, etc.),³¹ and division components are similarly organized. For instance, "mechanized infantry battalions perform generally the same types of missions and have generally the same capabilities as infantry battalions,"³² and an airborne infantry battalion is organized and operates in the same manner as an infantry battalion.³³ The Army believes that it tailors its divisions for specific environments, but in fact such tailoring amounts only to adding or subtracting standardized "building blocks."³⁴ Thus, the United States has been mistaken in the belief that it has an all-purpose organization and tactical system suitable for both a wide range of contingencies for U.S. forces and for imitation abroad.

A natural consequence has been a failure to appreciate the advantages of specific solutions for specific localities. Indigenous forces (1) are not designed for defensive strategies, (2) are often structured on assumptions that may no longer be appropriate for U.S. forces, much less foreign, MAP-supported forces, and (3) use unnecessarily expensive doctrinal and operating practices, partly because training and readiness are often judged by U.S. standards and partly because equipment is un-

²⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Division*, p. 3.

²⁹ In Vietnam, prior to the Tet offensive, the bulk of the U.S. effort went toward "search and destroy" operations (and their euphemisms). General Westmoreland justified those tactics as being "essentially the traditional attack mission of the infantry," that is, "to find, fix in place, fight, and destroy enemy forces." U.S.G. Sharp and W. C. Westmoreland, *Report on the War in Vietnam as of 30 June 1968*, Washington, D.C., 1969, pp. 91 and 249.

³⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Division*, p. 3.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 17. Another U.S. Army publication, *The Rifle Company, Platoons, and Squads*, FM 7-10, April 1970, is even more specific. It states on p. 1-1 that:

(a) This manual provides doctrinal guidance for the employment of the rifle company, rifle . . . platoons, and . . . squads organic to the infantry, airborne infantry, airmobile infantry, light infantry, and mechanized infantry battalion.

(b) The material is applicable worldwide unless otherwise stated. In the spectrum of warfare, this manual is applicable to

- (1) General war to include a consideration of the employment of and protection from nuclear munitions and chemical, biological, and radioactive material, and operations in chemical, biological, and radiological environments.
- (2) Limited war.
- (3) Cold war to include stability operations.

³⁴ Varying the mix of tanks and of infantry battalions is termed "strategic tailoring"; adding or subtracting units to a division, such as logistical elements, is termed "tactical tailoring." U.S. Department of the Army, *The Division*, p. 3.

necessarily complex.³⁵ Throughout the world the United States has declared its objectives to be deterrence and defense. Yet it has unwittingly sponsored all-purpose, *offensive*, expeditionary forces that do not optimize either deterrence or defense because of their low "teeth-to-tail" ratio and consequent low "initial" combat capability relative to the opponent's.

The remainder of this section discusses, under the four types of threat most likely to face Third World countries, especially the forward-defense countries, why current MAP-supported forces and strategies may be inappropriate and what specific changes could be taken to improve their defenses. The four types of threat are:

1. Attack by the USSR or PRC.
2. Attack by a minor power (e.g., North Vietnam, North Korea, and the Balkan countries of the Warsaw Pact).
3. Insurgency.
4. Big unit insurgency and external attack, as in Vietnam.

THREAT POSSIBILITY: ATTACK BY THE USSR OR PRC

Military assistance was conceived initially as an element of the U.S. containment policy vis-à-vis Soviet and Communist Chinese territorial expansion. It is therefore natural that MAP planning for the principal European recipients and the peripheral European and Asian forward-defense countries has been driven by the "worst-case" threat—attack by the USSR or the PRC on their smaller neighbors. Defense of those countries has been conceived as requiring a coupling with American military power, sometimes interpreted as a minimum D-Day physical U.S. military presence, e.g., as in NATO, with a reinforcement capability—otherwise a full reinforcement capability, e.g., as in SEATO. Such coupling arrangements have driven the U.S. planning and commitment and have shaped allied planning and requirements.

The problem for all (self-sufficient or MAP-supported) forward-defense countries, should deterrence fail, has always been to prevent being overrun before adequate U.S. military help could be brought to bear. In the NATO central front case, a physical U.S. ground deployment was deemed necessary to assure sufficient delaying strength. In the case of the Third World forward-defense countries, the questions this concept raised for the United States were:

1. What integrated strategies should be pursued by U.S. allies and friends on the periphery of China and of the Soviet Union?
2. What military assistance (grant aid) should the United States give these

³⁵ One must distinguish, of course, between necessary complexity, incorporating new technology to cope with similar Soviet equipment, and unnecessary complexity resulting from gold-plating and overstated specifications. Overspecification often results from a neglect of opportunity costs. Perceptions held by senior commanders, based on their experience as company and battalion commanders, have sometimes caused military decisionmakers to opt for costly suboptimizations at the unit level that detract from the larger system's effectiveness. For instance, the "equal mobility" thesis (supporting units should have cross-country mobility comparable with tanks) causes a preference for tracks over wheels in combat *and* combat-support vehicles and for complex tactical trucks over rugged commercial designs.

countries in peacetime to help them develop a maximum self-defense capability and facilitate U.S. reinforcement in an emergency?

3. How might the U.S. aid to these countries in case of attack be best configured?

In answer, MAP (grant aid) planning has followed a policy of providing conventional defense to buy time, to establish essential defense infrastructures, and to protect enough points of entry in the peripheral countries to permit effective deployment of U.S. forces. As already described, the United States has encouraged recipient countries to replicate the U.S. military establishment.

Forward-Defense Countries in a NATO-Warsaw Pact War: Greece and Turkey

In case of a major war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, almost by definition the decisive conflict would be in Germany; barring a stalemate, the outcome there would determine the outcome on the flanks. However, it is conceivable that for political reasons, such as a breakdown in NATO cohesion, a truce could exist on the central front and all the fighting might be on the southern flank. This possibility, which is really not a NATO-Pact war, is dealt with in the next section. In case of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, the Soviets would concentrate their effort on the critical center region in Europe and would devote only a secondary effort to the NATO flanks to assist their Balkan clients.³⁶ The most effective way to assist Turkey and Greece is therefore to have strong defenses (with a counteroffensive potential) in the central European sector.

Thus, Soviet strategic values would limit the immediate pressure on Greece and Turkey. Unfortunately, this assessment permits NATO and the United States to consider such questionable forward strategies as "mobile defense" and even a "counteroffensive" by Greek and Turkish forces into Communist territory. But to pit Greek and Turkish divisions, as currently constituted, against a Soviet-style force would risk their being penetrated, encircled, and destroyed in rapid order. Border defense by infantry corps (except if natural barriers exist, as in Anatolia) represents at best a trip-wire strategy to trigger a larger war. Such a strategy offers the defenders little flexibility for warfighting and defense. If Greece and Turkey are to fight conventionally, they must be prepared to withdraw to defensible lines that cannot be readily enveloped by Soviet mechanized and heliborne forces.³⁷ Otherwise

³⁶ For a discussion of the thesis that the Soviets can only expect to win a conventional war against NATO if it is short and thus must concentrate against Western Europe, see Canby, *NATO and Soviet Military Policy*, loc. cit.

³⁷ When the allied divisions were first organized by MAP in the early 1950s, the U.S. Army did not admit the vulnerability of infantry to tanks. Until 1962, the regular infantry division was thought—and taught in the U.S. Army school system—to be capable of fighting against Soviet mechanized divisions. Also until 1962, three of the five U.S. divisions in Europe were foot infantry. Ironically, during that time, the Turks emphasized a rearward defense of Thrace based on fortifications. Then in 1962, Turkey formally (but not actually) abandoned its historic barrier defense in favor of the generalized NATO strategy of forward defense that had come into vogue with West German entry into NATO. Matters were made worse by the misconceived McNaughton mission to Turkey in 1966-1967. The McNaughton mission rightly tried (but ultimately failed) to get the Turks to specialize more in their ground forces but mistakenly provided the equipment necessary for the Turks to implement a U.S. sought-for forward-mobile defense strategy.

in case of a major Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack, the key population and control centers of Greece and Turkey could be rapidly occupied.

Viewing Greek and Turkish strategy from their vantage point of self-defense, however, ignores the prevailing rationales on why the United States and NATO are interested in those nations. To NATO, the Greek and Turkish forces are part of the allied order of battle. These countries have the role of diverting Soviet forces, helping block a Soviet naval penetration into the Mediterranean, and denying resources to the enemy. Militarily, the diversionary role was once considered the more important; now the role of blocking Soviet access to the Mediterranean is emphasized.

The military importance of the Straits and the difficulty of blocking Soviet naval access to the Mediterranean should not be overstressed. First, since NATO's interest is the negative one of blocking, physical possession of the shores of the Straits is not necessary. The narrow and treacherous channels of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles can be readily blocked (e.g., by sunken ships), mined, or subjected to interdiction. Second, the military significance of the Straits is reduced by the fact that the Soviet fleet is already in the Mediterranean and has supply facilities on the Arab littoral. Third, the Soviet surface fleet is a sea-denial fleet originally designed for deployment in Soviet coastal waters. Its mission has been to abort carrier and Polaris nuclear strikes aimed at the Soviet homeland; as the U.S. systems have extended their standoff distance, the Soviets have felt compelled to extend their defenses. Consequently, this fleet would probably already have been deployed by D-Day. Fourth, the argument that the Mediterranean lifelines are critical to NATO is not as vital an issue as in earlier years—it derives from the old British "lifelines-to-India" thesis. What is now important is *oil*, particularly in a long war requiring European industrial mobilization, like World Wars I and II. In a shorter war (of, say, up to 90 days), NATO already stores in auxiliary facilities much of its requirements; in any case, requirements of bulk oil could be met by expropriating a small percentage of what is stored on the Continent for civilian purposes. Finally, NATO has to face up to the futility of worrying about oil lifelines to the Arab littoral if the Soviets control the source through peacetime political penetration. Thus, Soviet capture of the Straits in a war with NATO is not as *militarily* important as is sometimes claimed.

As regards the diversionary role of Turkey and Greece, it is unrealistic to expect those countries to tie down more than a few Soviet divisions unless they are given an effective offensive capability. The heavy-infantry divisions that now dominate their forces are too slow and too vulnerable to withstand the mechanized Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. Only if the Turkish and Greek forces were almost completely mechanized could they pose a serious threat to the Soviets. Such mechanization would be prohibitively expensive for Turkey, Greece, and the United States. Even with mechanization, there is no guarantee that Greece and Turkey could divert significant Soviet forces from the critical Central Front. By using space to absorb the impact of even an enhanced Greek and Turkish attack, the Soviets could neutralize its effect upon the Central Front; should the Soviets win on the Central Front, a major Greek and Turkish offensive into Communist territory would be easily cut off and destroyed once Soviet divisions were redeployed.

Several policy implications follow from these arguments. The most important one is that Greece and Turkey cannot be major assets in the U.S. order of battle against the Soviets in other NATO areas. In a NATO conflict, those countries cannot

be expected to divert major Soviet forces from the crucial Central Front. They can block Soviet access through the Straits. However, because the Straits can readily be blocked by other means, and in any case are not of overriding military importance, NATO need not require the Turks to concentrate on holding the shores. Rather, the Turks and Greeks should be permitted a less constrained strategy designed to defend their own population and territory.

A second implication is that Greek and Turkish forces need not be modeled along U.S. offensive lines. Instead, for U.S. interests as well as their own, those forces could be oriented to a more defensive role, to include the prospect of an indefinite unconventional phase of war. Conventional forces organized for a short defensive war are inherently much cheaper than offensive forces; they require fewer vehicles or less transport and a much smaller logistical tail. If the forward-defense countries were structured for defense and their sustaining capacity reduced to that of their Warsaw Pact opponents, more divisions could be created from the manpower and other resources released from supporting forces.³⁸

A third implication is that the current strategy of forward mobile defense is unsound. Greece and Turkey can compete with the Soviets in a conventional war only by relying upon a combination of barrier systems,³⁹ in-depth forces, and terrain characteristics to immobilize the mechanized Soviet forces so that light infantry can cope with the Soviet armor. Strategy for Greece and Turkey should be realistically designed to give way before a Soviet invasion, seeking to harass, attrit, and eventually bog it down. Such tactics are particularly suited for Greece and for Anatolia because of their rough terrain and the relative scarcity of infantry in the Soviet force. The Soviet force is well designed for tank and antitank warfare in the central plains of Europe, but it is not designed to fight against an amorphous opponent in close infantry combat, as Yugoslav military planners have pointed out.

A strategy giving way before superior force recognizes the limitations of a weaker defender. Rather than trying to hold terrain, it seeks to inflict intolerable costs upon the occupiers over time. Its rationale is that a major power is not likely to commit a large army indefinitely to an area of secondary importance. Barrier

³⁸ Overall, U.S. division slices could be cut *more* than 50 percent if U.S. forces were stripped of their all-purpose, offensive, long-war characteristics. That would make U.S. division slices comparable to Soviet slices, which are geared to offense but lack the all-purpose characteristics and sustainability.

³⁹ Defenses keyed to barriers (like the Maginot Line) have limited usefulness for NATO's Central Front because of their vulnerability to penetration and subsequent outflanking by high-speed armored operations. However, in many other parts of the world, particularly where nature has already provided strong natural barriers that need relatively minor strengthening, barrier and fortification systems can be a powerful form of defense. If cheaply constructed (unlike the so-called McNamara line in Vietnam) and lightly manned (like those of the French in Algeria and currently those of the Israelis), barriers can also be effective in isolating areas for counterinsurgency operations.

While the barrier itself may not be cheap, a *system* based on barriers can be low in cost. Armies modeled on U.S. forces are expensive because of the weapons, vehicles, and maintenance required to support mobile operations. Static barrier forces do not require such support, and the vehicles needed for resupply can be simple ones, from the civilian economy. Only the reserves for counterattacks require tactical mobility, but the limited distances involved greatly simplify the logistical requirements.

The basic requirements for barriers are simply (1) obstacles to slow and expose the enemy's movements to more accurate and longer concentrations of defensive fire, and (2) entrenchments of earth and concrete to protect the defender. Building such obstacles and entrenchments involves labor-intensive activity, the cost of which can be borne locally; large MAP funding is not needed.

Another advantage of barrier defense is that the light force required to defend barriers can perform other military missions. Thus, light-infantry forces can be used for counterinsurgency in low-level conflicts and as blocking forces operating from barriers should an invasion occur. If attacked by a major power, a minor power could gain time by defending itself with a barrier system while preparing for less conventional forms of warfare.

systems rely on terrain to strengthen the defender; they could be useful in Thrace and across the Greek peninsula. Finally, since a light-infantry posture is suitable for both barrier and territorial defense, both countries could opt for a mixed, sequential strategy of barrier defense followed by unconventional warfare in enemy-occupied areas and defense of national redoubts in remote, easily defensible areas, such as the Anatolian plateau.

Forward-Defense Countries Under Attack by the USSR: Localized Soviet Attack on Greece and Turkey

Whereas secondary countries coupled with NATO would derive their protection from the diversion of enemy resources to more important theaters, secondary countries not so coupled would bear the brunt of a Soviet attack. That is obviously a heavy burden to bear; if the Soviets can readily overrun Western Europe's relatively strong mechanized conventional forces (as is often asserted by Western military and civilian authorities alike), *a fortiori* Greece, Turkey, and other Soviet-threatened peripheral countries have little hope of withstanding a Soviet main effort. Yet Department of Defense plans, from which MAP draws its guidance, are premised on the resistance of local conventional forces to a Soviet invasion until the arrival of U.S. air and ground forces.

Two questions are raised: (1) Could defending forces survive long enough for U.S. reinforcement to be meaningful? and (2) What could the U.S. reinforcement do after arriving? The present strategy of forward defense by conventional forces in the border regions may invite disaster. Forward forces can be too easily enveloped and destroyed piecemeal by Soviet forces. The loss of major forward forces would open the remainder of the country to ready occupation. Rather than trying to defend forward areas, the immediate problem of the defenders would be to extricate forward deployed forces. Extrication can prevent a rapid collapse, but what else it accomplishes is open to question. The most that conventional forces can do *militarily* against a major Soviet invasion is to buy enough time for the deployment of airmobile U.S. forces.

The commitment of airmobile/airborne-type U.S. divisions would symbolize U.S. determination and would give a clear signal to the Soviets of an escalation of warfare which could possibly go to the nuclear level, but such divisions have little warfighting capability *per se*. Airborne divisions are not viable warfighting instruments against Soviet armored forces, and they lack tactical mobility—assuming they could be safely landed in the defending country.⁴⁰ Hence, such divisions could only provide pockets of resistance that the Soviets could easily overrun but would more likely outflank and bypass to minimize the Soviet-U.S. confrontation and to consolidate quickly their hold on the country. At that point, the encircled U.S. airborne divisions would find themselves in an untenable military position. What

⁴⁰ "If the enemy has adequate resources to commit a large number of mechanized and/or armored units and the capability of simultaneously conducting a determined defense against attacking ground forces, the airborne force stands little chance of accomplishing its mission." *Joint and Combined Forces/-Joint Airborne Operations*, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 1970, pp. 5-1 and 5-2. This statement about the offensive use of airborne forces behind enemy lines presumes air superiority and extensive air support (as well as general combat superiority), premises that are questionable in the case under discussion. Where enemy forces are superior, airborne forces would be even less viable.

the United States could "buy" with such an airborne presence is conjectural. Unless U.S. decisionmakers were willing to escalate the conflict, either by conventional means in other theaters or by nuclear threat, the United States could find itself militarily overstretched and humbled.

Unless the United States were to expand the number of its divisions, either through a larger peacetime active inventory or much readier reserves,⁴¹ areas other than Western Europe cannot, against Soviet assault, expect U.S. reinforcements of *more than the three or four airborne, airmobile, and marine infantry divisions that comprise the U.S. strategic reserve*. The heavier mechanized/armored divisions, which are required for combat against the Soviets, are either stationed in Europe or are earmarked for Europe; they would not be (or should not be) available for a secondary theater in a period of tension with the Soviets. Moreover, even if the United States did have additional mechanized divisions available for commitment to Soviet-threatened peripheral countries, *time would not permit* their deployment without the expensive prepositioning of equipment. Major U.S. reinforcements, sufficient to cope with the large number of divisions the Soviets would use to insure a quick victory,⁴² would have to await the mobilization and deployment of U.S. reserve forces. That would require at least six months, which greatly exceeds the conventional defensive capacity of those countries against a Soviet onslaught. U.S. contingency plans for reinforcing Soviet-threatened forward-defense countries with U.S. ground forces thus contain an inherent and unsolvable dilemma: airlifted but timely forces are too light to be effective against Soviet armor in open terrain; sealifted mechanized forces can be effective but take too long to arrive; and prepositioning any sizable amount of equipment is too expensive with so many possible areas of deployment.

The conclusion of this argument is that the plans implicit in containment policies for reinforcing Greece, Turkey, and other countries on the Soviet periphery are unrealistic and that expensive conventional ground forces organized on the U.S. model lend themselves too easily to an undesirable strategy. Such forces cannot cope with the overwhelming size and speed of Soviet forces. Therefore, in a localized war against the Soviets, as in the previously discussed case where Greece and Turkey were firmly integrated into NATO, Greek and Turkish conventional forces should be structured for defense and a short conventional war phase. Such restyling would permit expensive sustaining and force projection resources (which cause U.S.-style forces to have low teeth-to-tail ratios) to be converted into larger numbers of combat units. Restructured defense forces could of course not defeat the Soviets, but by increasing the cost of invasion above present levels by their greater conventional warfighting capacity and unconventional-war potential, they would have greater deterrence value than presently configured forces.

An unconventional-war option should be particularly attractive to Soviet-threatened forward-defense countries because it gives them a potential to deter the Soviets without direct external assistance. The Soviets are particularly sensitive to

⁴¹ As could be done, for instance, by restructuring them from all-purpose, offensive, expeditionary forces to a mix of more specialized forces.

⁴² That the Soviets would opt for a short, rapidly paced war (versus the U.S. military's expectation of a longer, slower war) follows from Soviet tactical style and the scarcity of supporting units in their force structure. The few sustaining resources that do exist are concentrated in East Germany and Western Russia. Of course, these sustaining units could be redeployed to the southern borders, but only at the cost of denuding the critical NATO region at a time of high tension.

the possibility of having large forces tied down for long periods in areas of secondary importance, because their conventional military advantage over the West owes to their greater initial combat power and ability to overrun Europe before the considerably greater economic potential of NATO can be translated into actual military power.

The Air and Naval Requirements of Soviet-Threatened Forward-Defense Countries

While ground forces are clearly the dominant military component for Soviet-threatened forward-defense countries, assistance for their air and naval forces has been almost as great as for their armies. Local naval forces offer little to these countries that is relevant to deterrence or warfighting against the Soviets except minelaying and coastal-patrol ships, which can now carry antiship missiles. Naval forces cannot be brought to bear upon the Soviets' predominant capability—land power. In addition, Soviet naval infantry is not currently a warfighting military threat to those countries because of its small size and inability to make opposed landings.⁴³ Even so, since the economic cost (as opposed to accounting value) of secondhand naval craft to the United States is low, a valid argument still exists for moderate support of peacetime coastal-defense functions as a capital-intensive measure to free more of the recipient's own capital for its ground forces.

While U.S.-assisted naval programs have been small, air programs have been expensive and consume scarce technical skills. Yet, air programs, as presently constituted, buy little against a Soviet attack. Until recipient countries acquire aircraft shelters and "smart" ordnance, MAP assistance should not furnish more than a small air-defense interceptor force to guard the country's airspace in peacetime and to give air cover for the advance element of reinforcing U.S. airpower. In the absence of aircraft shelters or extensive warning systems, the Soviets could destroy most local aircraft within days, if not hours. The lack of shelters also creates the destabilizing conditions that invite a surprise attack. Without more accurate "smart" ordnance (e.g., the laser-guided Paveway and electro-optical TV-guided bombs and antitank missiles), friendly airpower will have little effect upon the ground battle because of the poor accuracy of jet-delivered "dumb" ordnance, even if the large numbers of dedicated Soviet air-defense fighters permitted allied close-air-support or interdiction sorties.

In World War II tactical airpower was extremely effective and perhaps even the critical element supporting U.S. and British ground forces against the Germans. Fighters could make repeated, low-flying passes and expect to survive and to kill personnel and destroy tanks with their machine guns and 20-mm cannon. However, this fact or experience has been invalidated by changes in ground forces—specifically better armor and the explosive growth in ground air-defense capabilities. Many air weapons are no longer effective against the thicker deck armor of modern battle tanks, and "strafing" ordnance has given way to inherently inaccurate dive-bombing attacks with large gravity bombs delivered at high speeds from high altitudes. Even more important has been the effect of air defenses in forcing aircraft into greater standoff distances. To avoid high attrition, aircraft with dumb ordnance tend to limit

⁴³ Much of the shoreline (e.g., in Thrace) is also not suitable for amphibious landings.

themselves to single passes in dive-bombing attacks from high altitude. The quest for survivability has had other adverse effects upon tactical airpower: high aircraft speeds limit target acquisition at low levels (except at sea and in the desert); high delivery altitudes require better ceiling and visibility conditions that often preclude the use of tactical air; and insuring high performance for attacking aircraft has increased maintenance requirements, which in turn has slowed aircraft turnaround time and lowered the sortie rate. Finally these adverse results have been compounded by the economic infeasibility of fielding large numbers of expensive modern aircraft and the need to divert expensive air assets to supporting missions (flak suppression, ECM, rescue, etc.)

Smart ordnance redresses much of tactical airpower's difficulties since World War II by allowing greater standoff distances and much improved kill probabilities.⁴⁴ But the cost of modern aircraft makes it impossible to acquire masses of tactical aircraft. It thus follows that as long as "smart" ordnance is either not available or considered undesirable to provide allies, the usefulness of modernizing local tactical air forces (except interceptors) should be carefully scrutinized.

Even if MAP recipients' air forces acquired aircraft shelters and "smart" ordnance, three additional conditions would have to be met to justify expensive air programs:

First, because of the size, sophistication, and air-defense emphasis of Soviet-style air forces, the Soviets can be expected to enjoy overwhelming air superiority over Third World countries in the absence of U.S. air forces. Challenging Soviet supremacy would require expanding and modernizing these air forces with expensive first-line aircraft. Yet without such modernization those countries would find close-air-support and interdiction missions difficult. Consequently, little would be gained by providing fighter-bombers for those two missions.

Second, since Third World forward-defense countries cannot reasonably be expected to defend themselves conventionally without a major diversion of Soviet strength (e.g., by NATO) for more than several weeks, it is not desirable to buy high-cost systems that would both be vulnerable to early destruction and unsuited for prolonged unconventional warfare even if they should survive the initial onslaught. The Yugoslav contention that sophisticated aircraft are not only too costly but also unsuited to their needs is an argument which similarly situated peripheral countries should consider more seriously.

⁴⁴ The cost-effectiveness potential of "smart" bombs for certain missions, such as against point targets, lies in the fact that though laser-guided bombs cost several times more than conventional bombs, their kill probabilities are far greater. Additional advantages of "smart" ordnance are that delivery aircraft can drop their bombs from higher altitudes and from greater ranges, are not locked into prescribed flight paths, and can take evasive action during the delivery run without affecting weapon accuracy. Thus, the inclusion of attrition further increases the attractiveness of the new ordnance by reducing system costs. For armored warfare, the Maverick antitank missile is the important innovation. Without "smart" ordnance, close air support is a relatively unattractive use of tactical airpower. With new ordnance, tactical air appears somewhat more cost-effective than the current U.S. armored division in attriting (but not stopping or holding) enemy armor.

Third, the offensive power of Soviet tactical air has been exaggerated by those who assume a mirror-imaged U.S.-style air force for the Soviets. Soviet ground success does not depend upon Soviet close air support. Being specialized for air defense, Soviet tactical airpower has only a fraction of the "trucking" (i.e., payload times range) capacity of U.S.-designed, all-purpose aircraft.⁴⁵ Moreover, Soviet tactical air does not yet have "smart" ordnance and suffers from the same accuracy limitation as U.S. close air support did earlier. For these reasons an open question exists as to whether Third World countries should attempt to compete with Soviet tactical air by obtaining an expensive interceptor force or whether most of their air-defense requirements should be handled by ground antiaircraft systems (which are needed, in any case, to force Soviet aircraft into high-altitude-limited pass attacks).⁴⁶

In short, expensive airpower, even with shelters and "smart" ordnance, does not look particularly attractive against the Soviets, unless available in sufficient strength to challenge overall Soviet supremacy for at least temporary local air cover. A more attractive option is to reinforce Third World air forces with U.S. (or NATO) airpower. Only the U.S. Air Force is of the size and sophistication necessary to cope with Soviet airpower.⁴⁷ Whether or not the United States maintains its basic policy of direct reinforcement of allied countries attacked by a major power, there is no point in paying for a multitude of obsolescent, miniature air forces to engage Soviet airpower. Since airpower is very mobile, can be readily extricated once committed (ground forces cannot), and can be rapidly shifted from theater to theater, U.S. tactical airpower can be deployed to counter Soviet commitments of airpower against Third World countries.

To allow U.S. tactical airpower to play its role effectively, provision should be made for the construction of aircraft shelters and the support infrastructure without which the rapid introduction of U.S. airpower in a conflict would not be possible. As long as Greece and Turkey remain coupled with NATO, the aircraft shelter program for them need not be large because they would be secondary theaters (as previously

⁴⁵ Air defense was the purpose of Soviet tactical air in World War II and has apparently remained so. Thus, regardless of numbers, Soviet-equipped air forces do not represent a serious *offensive* threat. The offensive threat is concentrated in their *ground* forces. Soviet tactical air was a major offensive threat only during the brief period when aircraft were the sole means of tactical nuclear delivery. The Soviets now emphasize ground-to-ground missile systems for tactical nuclear delivery. (While the United States still relies heavily upon air delivery, ground-to-ground delivery now dominates in almost every weapon system characteristic.)

⁴⁶ Three facts should be borne in mind about ground air defense. First, the main purpose of ground air defense is not to destroy enemy aircraft but to prevent enemy aircraft from damaging one's own assets. Destroying enemy aircraft is only a means to that end. Second, in the two-sided air battle of World War II, more aircraft were downed by ground guns than by other aircraft. Third, in a two-sided war, most of the damage by one side's tactical air is to the other side's tactical air. That would apply particularly to Soviet tactical air because of its air-defense design.

⁴⁷ The number of U.S. tactical aircraft, including reserves and replacement aircraft, is considerably larger than Soviet tactical air, as a large fraction of their fighter force belongs to the Soviet strategic air-defense command. A problem here, as with ground forces, is that the Soviets place their aircraft in visible squadrons for immediate use and for unit replacement, whereas the United States has reserves of individual replacements to sustain a relatively small number of active squadrons. In cost and sophistication, U.S. tactical air greatly exceeds that of the Soviets. The tactical-air share of the U.S. defense budget is several times larger than that of the Soviet budget.

discussed). Should they be decoupled, the shelter program for them as well as for other Soviet-threatened forward-defense countries would have to be larger to allow a viable air capability.

In conclusion, in preparing the air defense of forward-defense countries against a hypothetical Soviet attack, (1) MAP assistance should not be determined by the magnitude of the potential air threat, (2) against the Soviet threat, local air forces should generally be limited to air-defense interceptors designed less for warfighting than for satisfying peacetime political purposes, and (3) military assistance should emphasize antiaircraft ground systems and the labor-intensive (and hence low U.S. cost) construction of aircraft shelters and support for reinforcing U.S. aircraft.

Chinese-Threatened Forward-Defense Countries

Defense against an attack by the Chinese People's Republic is much easier than against one by the USSR. The Chinese do not have the armored and heliborne forces to conduct the kind of high-speed operations that make the Soviet threat so dangerous and difficult to counter conventionally,⁴⁸ nor is the terrain of the CPR's weaker neighbors conducive to high-speed operations. The Chinese have a military system built around an automatic weapons and mortar-equipped light infantry. The Chinese Army employs tactics designed to reduce its dependence upon and vulnerability to artillery and possesses a virtually inexhaustible manpower replacement pool for such easily trained tactical skills. A major strategic characteristic is that the Chinese cannot project the large forces its size would seem to indicate. While U.S. security planning has assumed a potential Chinese threat of 30-40 divisions, this assumption has been based upon logistical road-throughput calculations. In point of fact road-throughput capabilities have to be viewed as the upside potential based upon road network constraints. Other constraints working upon the Chinese reduce the Chinese threat to much less than 30-40 divisions.⁴⁹ The critical determinants of a PRC attack on Taiwan are the United States' willingness to commit its naval power and the PRC's limited naval and amphibious capabilities, rather than China's total resources or the size of its army.

Whereas the discussion of a Soviet attack included both alliance war and a Soviet attack on weak neighbors, in the case of China only attacks against weaker neighbors need to be discussed. Strong, integrated alliances do not exist, and in any case, multitheater fronts are of questionable use in a conventional war against the PRC.⁵⁰ For example, a PRC attack against South Korea could only be marginally weakened by an allied counteroffensive in Southeast Asia. The constraints upon China are its difficulties in projecting its forces offensively because of limited transport nets, logistical weaknesses (including high rates of equipment breakdown), and the regional structuring of the Chinese forces for command, administration, and logistics. Opening a second front to relieve pressures elsewhere would not seriously

⁴⁸ Of about 130 Chinese line divisions, only 5 are armored. The Chinese also have a large number of independent armored regiments, which are parceled out to infantry armies. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1972-1973*, London, September 1972.

⁴⁹ The authors are grateful to their colleague William Whitson for this analysis.

⁵⁰ Only the USSR is in a position to threaten by conventional arms the existence of the Chinese state. That is because Soviet forces are already poised, are conveniently located for a quick thrust in favorable terrain, and have a style of warfare that the Chinese cannot counter directly by conventional means.

affect those constraints. The Chinese could meet allied counterthreats from forces locally billeted and would not have to divert forces (except airpower) from the primary theater. Initiating a second front would only compound U.S. problems and increase U.S. casualties.

PRC Attack on South Korea. For South Korea, a strategy of forward defense based upon specially designed barrier systems and forces deserves serious consideration as the most advantageous means of slowing or containing the Chinese. South Korea's forward defense is not particularly vulnerable to encirclement and piecemeal destruction (as are those of Soviet neighbors) because of its mountainous terrain, the limited Chinese/North Korean mechanized/airborne/amphibious capability, and the narrowness of the Korean peninsula. A barrier strategy would (1) hold the Chinese off longer; (2) lose less territory requiring later regaining by an allied counteroffensive; (3) cause greater Chinese casualties because of the repetitive requirement for large infantry assaults against multiple fortified positions; (4) permit the South Koreans to mobilize a much larger wartime force because of lower equipment requirements and simplified military occupational skills; (5) lower U.S. peacetime assistance costs by replacing the need for sophisticated equipment with labor-intensive barriers which can be financed by the South Koreans themselves; (6) be no worse off than presently in assisting U.S. forces to regain lost territory because much of the initial Korean heavy-equipment inventory would have been lost or no longer in a state of satisfactory repair by the time reinforcing U.S. troops would be prepared for their counteroffensive; (7) enable Korean forces, structured as light infantry, to be more useful for assisting other countries for the reasons described later; and (8) be equally effective as the present strategy for deterring Chinese aggression by raising the spectre that blatant Chinese aggression against South Korea might prompt Japan to increase its defense budget and outclass the Chinese militarily—a risk that could far outweigh any conceivable gain for the PRC.

Other strategies are less attractive against a Chinese invasion of South Korea. A counteroffensive strategy would foreclose the advantage of defense and would require a larger supporting tail for combat forces. Taking the offense against a superior invader is risky, unless a fortuitous opening occurs. Trading space for time seems neither necessary nor militarily desirable in this case. Giving way to infantry masses in order to set up an armored riposte (i.e., a mobile defense) is sometimes a useful tactic, but not in South Korea.⁵¹ Unconventional territorial defense is less attractive for South Korea than elsewhere. It is basically a strategy of last resort. The South Koreans have a viable option in barrier defense. Moreover, an unconventional strategy for South Korea may lack the deterrent effect that makes such a strategy attractive elsewhere. Unlike the Soviets in the case of Yugoslavia, the Chinese might not be deterred by the prospect of maintaining an occupation army in South Korea because its opportunity cost to them would probably be low, except

⁵¹ Trading space for time or to absorb Chinese blows has several other disadvantages for the South Koreans. An American heavy-infantry posture (such as the South Koreans have) requires set-piece battle for maximum effectiveness. That means extensive coordination among lateral, reserve, and artillery units and extensive preparation of the terrain for barriers and fields of fire—all of which requires considerable time. If the South Koreans were to adopt a delaying strategy, there is too great a risk of a break in the required coordination, thus giving an opening for the quantitatively superior Chinese. Hence, a delaying strategy is not suitable when the most defensible terrain is forward anyway and ample opportunity exists to build barrier systems in peacetime.

in the extreme case of imminent Soviet attack against the CPR. Moreover, the national determination necessary to conduct successful unconventional warfare could be weakened if the Chinese operated from behind a North Korean facade.

South Korea's problem is to design a force structure suitable for implementing a forward defense with in-depth barrier systems. South Korean divisions are currently modeled upon the pre-1957 triangular U.S. infantry division, which of course is not optimized for barrier warfare. It is an all-purpose division that is most appropriate for slow-moving campaigns where set-piece battle techniques of elaborate obstacles and fields of fire can be applied. Such divisions are expensive because of their large supporting-artillery, engineer, and logistical requirements. Barrier divisions, on the other hand, can be light infantry equipped with automatic small arms, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers to suppress enemy mass attacks, and specialized antitank units along the few corridors suitable for tank thrusts. These divisions essentially need only to stand and fight and occasionally withdraw or infiltrate behind the next fully manned barrier. Only the reserve divisions need an offensive capability; and if the offensive is limited to counterattacks, large logistical tails are again not required. Stripping divisions and their nondivisional support down to specialized units would release resources, from which more combat units could be formed. These additional units would provide greater depth to the defense and would reduce the overall need for mobile units.

Airpower requirements for the South Koreans in the Chinese threat context are similar in some respects to those for countries facing a Soviet threat. The main difference is that China's air defenses are considerably weaker, which allows some opportunities for South Korean ground-support sorties and permits airpower to intervene more easily. If the United States is prepared to intervene with airpower against a Chinese attack, then the South Koreans need only interceptors and a small ground-support capability to offset an initial Chinese surprise attack (an unlikely occurrence unless the North Koreans took the initial role of assault troops for a joint Chinese/North Korean attack) that could disrupt Korean defenses. Air cover and close air support would then be needed to "plug" the gap until South Korean ground forces could reposition themselves. This suggests that the major threat of Chinese attack should *not* be the determinant of South Korean air requirements—rather the lesser threat of minor-power attack, discussed in the next section, should be the determinant. Thereafter, high-cost air systems can be provided by the United States. Similar considerations apply to high-cost naval systems. The South Koreans only need a capability for coastal patrol and minelaying and clearing.

PRC Attack on South Asia and Southeast Asia. South Asia and Southeast Asia are notable for their natural terrain barriers. China is separated from most of its strategically valuable neighbors (except Vietnam) by wide stretches of inhospitable mountains and jungles. Few roads or railways exist and living off the land is infeasible. If the Chinese were to attack, their lines of communication would be more vulnerable to unconventional warfare and to air interdiction than the North Vietnamese have been, particularly as U.S. Air Force gunship technology and "smart" ordnance are refined.⁵²

⁵² Should the Chinese attack Thailand without a long-range interceptor capability, a small force of 20-30 AC-130E gunships with fighter support operating at night, and cheap fighters with smart ordnance for daylight operations, could restrict Chinese projection capabilities to only a few small divisions in southern Thailand.

Because of the French constructed transport nets in Indochina in its coastal plain, affording ready access to the sea, South Vietnam is probably more vulnerable to Chinese attack than other South Asian countries. A Chinese attack would be difficult for South Vietnam to counter because its defensive positions can always be outflanked from the highlands, and the Chinese forces would probably try to combine a frontal assault with increased guerrilla activity in the rear of the defenders. Consequently, dependence upon conventional defense lines would not be an attractive tactic. An unconventional territorial defense would also not be effective in a country whose population is ideologically divided, especially since Chinese forces could be expected to operate jointly with North Vietnamese forces.

Therefore, the best option might be a mix of light forces in a strong-point defense and mobile heavy forces to block enemy thrusts, and also light-infantry units to use unconventional tactics against the enemy's communication lines and against outflanking infiltration movements through the rugged highlands, which can operate as a deep barrier for the defender. Successful countering of enemy movement would force the enemy to concentrate, expend precious firepower, and thus become ever more dependent upon a vulnerable line of communications in continuing the attack. Since invading forces are less familiar with the local terrain, the defender's light infantry, if properly designed and prepared, should be able to outmaneuver the enemy's light infantry and to divert many of the enemy units into protecting their flanks and rear. A light infantry for South Vietnam also has the advantage of usefulness in counterinsurgency warfare. While this blocking/counter-thrusting strategy would provide a credible defense, South Vietnam cannot be expected to successfully defend itself alone against a combined Chinese/North Vietnamese invasion. The problem remains to develop a strategy that would protect South Vietnam with minimum U.S. help.

In Burma, Thailand, and to a lesser extent Cambodia, Chinese attacks can be handled by taking advantage of the invader's need to project its force through inhospitable terrain. That consideration would rule out forward defense of border regions because large indigenous conventional forces would be difficult to supply and would not be viable against the Chinese operating near their own borders. Optimally, indigenous conventional forces should be concentrated against the Chinese only after the latter have passed through the jungle/mountain barriers and are within striking distance of population centers on the coastal plain.

One problem with a delaying or withdrawal strategy is the political price paid by any regime that seemingly "surrenders" so much territory to a foreign invader.⁵³ Only unconventional defenses would be feasible within the jungle/mountain barrier. The Chinese could too easily outflank and overpower conventional defenses because flanks cannot be anchored and adequate fields of fire would be difficult to obtain. In addition, U.S.-modeled conventional forces are more appropriate for a rearward defense where the ground can be better utilized. After the Chinese forces had moved through the terrain barrier and had become stretched, the all-purpose defensive and offensive potential of U.S.-designed forces could be appropriately used

⁵³ Especially as the more likely direct Chinese thrust would be an "in and out" strategy of seizing a border area as a base for local insurgent units and then withdrawing. Forward defense with conventional forces would not be a solution to this threat. The best counter would be a light-infantry force that would operate unconventionally against the Chinese and would disrupt any attempt by them to organize an insurgent movement.

to block, cut off, and destroy the forward Chinese elements. However, if that strategy were adopted, it could be accomplished more effectively by the specialized blocking and counterthrusting/counterattacking measures discussed above. Light infantry is also necessary for the unconventional tactics needed to harass and disrupt Chinese lines of communication in the terrain barrier and to force the diversion of combat troops to protect it.

The mission of local naval forces in Southeast Asia is coastal defense, especially the interdiction of enemy or insurgent supplies by sea, a function requiring inexpensive coastal craft as long as the U.S. fleet is available to counter overt operations of the Chinese navy. Airpower is a different matter. Given the distance from their base territory and the limited range of their fighters, the Chinese could not project a strong air capability. This provides scope, if correctly applied, for friendly ground-support missions because of the absence of the air-cover problem. Friendly air forces can be designed for these specialized missions with dedicated aircraft rather than the more expensive all-purpose aircraft which have characterized U.S. airpower and hence U.S. assistance programs.

Fighter-bombers, particularly expensive, high-performance aircraft, are in general not suitable for ground support unless armed with "smart" ordnance. High-performance fighters also do not have the loitering and target-acquisition capabilities of simpler aircraft such as the A-1. Moreover, a major limitation of all fighter-bombers is their need for fair-weather visibility. Lest the enemy limit its movements to times of reduced visibility, a meaningful capability requires sophisticated sensors aboard gunship firing platforms and, in case of significant Chinese air defense, several high-performance jets per gunship to suppress SAMs and to provide air cover. A force of 20-30 gunships would provide a significant interdiction capability. Since the Chinese do not have the capability for attacking all the countries of the region simultaneously, without overly subdividing the force they are capable of projecting, gunship teams, as well as the more sophisticated tactical airpower needed to counter Chinese air defenses, should be provided by the United States as necessary. This suggests that the present U.S. policy of subsidizing high-performance airpower parcels to Southeast Asian forward-defense countries should not be justified by the Chinese threat, but by lesser threats where lesser sophistication and costs are involved and the United States will be less committed and less willing to intervene.

THREAT POSSIBILITY: SUBTHEATER CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT

Another threat facing forward-defense countries is attack by a minor Communist power. In Asia, this threat is most relevant to South Korea. (South Vietnam is discussed under the threat category of combined insurgency/external attack.) In Europe, a possible though unlikely threat of this sort would be an attack by Balkan Communist countries on Greece and Turkey.

U.S. defense planning has generally subsumed the threat of attack by a minor power under the "worst case" of major-power aggression. The theory has been that if the recipient country and U.S. forces are strong enough to handle the worst case, they can surely cope with less serious threats. The withdrawal of U.S. combat

elements under the Nixon Doctrine undermines the thesis that sufficiency for the "worst case" means sufficiency for subtheater conflicts. Subtheater threats can no longer be considered by the affected countries to be theater threats writ small. Third World countries must prepare themselves to face the minor (even though not the major) enemy alone. Compensating for the withdrawal of U.S. forces would seemingly require considerable additional military assistance. But that conclusion is based on security concepts which need reappraising in light of present realities.

A less serious complication is that specialized defensive forces designed for national survival by a small power against attacks from a major power may be overspecialized and lack the type of combat power needed in border areas to resist attacks by a small neighbor interested in limited objectives, such as irredentist annexations. Generalized, all-purpose forces imitating the U.S. model do not suffer from this liability; their problem is that nonspecialization causes such a large total for a requirement that insufficient combat forces may be available to thwart the minor power, much less the major power. The solution to this problem is obviously not towards generalization but towards finding a strategy or tactic suitable for the specialized force (designed for the major threat) or buying special components which will permit the specialized force to be able to adapt adequately to its secondary mission.

Minor-Power Attack on Greece and Turkey

The Balkan members of the Warsaw Pact cannot currently mount a serious threat against Greece and Turkey. They have the potential but not the actual capability. In military potential, the Balkan Warsaw Pact states have slightly less population than Greece and Turkey but almost twice as much GNP. The Balkan countries have made no effort to achieve regional military superiority, and the Soviets have given priority to the modernization of military forces in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Nominally, the Rumanians, Bulgarians, and Hungarians have the combined equivalent of about 19 motorized divisions, 5-2/3 tank divisions and 2/3 infantry divisions. In fact, their divisions are small (even by Soviet standards); much of their equipment is old (some of it dating from World War II); and their readiness standards are low. For instance, during the Czechoslovak invasion of 1968, the Bulgarian contingent (apparently the best units) required considerable Soviet sprucing before deployment into Czechoslovakia.

Opposing the local Warsaw Pact threat is a forward-deployed Greek and Turkish force structured along U.S. lines, composed of 5-1/3 armored/mechanized, 23-1/3 regular infantry, and 1-1/3 light-infantry division equivalents. While this force is relatively weak in antitank defenses like all U.S.-modeled forces, at existing force levels it could probably cope with the present local threat. Reducing MAP aid would be most detrimental to the Turkish capability of defending the open border areas of Thrace, whereas the Greeks, with low-interest credit subsidies, can now more or less provide for their own military equipment.

A shift in the present military balance by a reduction in U.S. aid (or an upgrading of local Warsaw Pact forces) would probably necessitate a major reassessment of the Turkish defense position. The present posture is too expensive for the Turks to maintain alone, and a reduction in divisions would undermine the forward de-

fense of Thrace. One solution would be to adopt a smaller, more mobile force with stronger tank and antitank capabilities.⁵⁴ That alternative would best meet the Balkan threat but would not, of course, suffice for coping with the more serious Soviet threat.

A more attractive conventional solution would be the forward deployment of specialized defensive forces designed for countering a Soviet attack. Since they would necessarily be strong in antitank weapons and contain tank-heavy reserves for counterattack, these forces (despite their immobility) could also defend the borders against the smaller Warsaw Pact states. This hypothetical solution is risky, however, if Soviet forces are deployed forward in the Balkan countries. A subsequent Soviet attack might then find Turkish forces away from their rearward, prepared defense positions in Thrace. To hedge against that possibility, the Turks would require larger tank and antitank reserves than would otherwise be needed to protect a forced withdrawal to a defensive position that could not be readily penetrated and enveloped by a much stronger Soviet opponent.

This line of reasoning leads to the important policy conclusion that a preferred solution exists that is contrary to current policy. Regardless of their posture, the Greeks and Turks cannot make an effective forward defense against a major Soviet attack (and would be hard pressed if Balkan Communist military capabilities were upgraded). They can defend themselves against the Soviets only by barrier warfare in Thrace near the Bosphorus and in the narrower portions of Greece and by preparing for unconventional territorial warfare following the eventual loss of these positions. While such a posture is not ideally suited for forward defense against the Balkan countries, it can be adequately adapted as previously discussed. U.S. policy should thus encourage the Greeks and the Turks to go back to their former, traditional, military strategy of barrier defense.

Minor-Power Attack on Korea

The defense of Korea is conceptually simpler than that of Greece and Turkey. The dilemma in Southeastern Europe is that the Greeks and Turks require different kinds of forces to defend their borders efficiently against the Balkan states than would be needed against a "worst-case" Soviet invasion. In Korea that complication does not exist so long as the objective is only to defend South Korea, not to launch an invasion of the North. The optimum defense posture against a Chinese attack is also the best way to avert a North Korean attack.

South Korea's military potential is considerably greater than North Korea's. Its population is 2.3 times larger, its GNP 2.5 times larger, and even its peacetime armed forces are 1.6 times larger. Moreover, South Korea has the advantage of being the defender, in mountainous terrain. Yet, the MAP program to modernize the South Korean forces—at a cost of \$1.5 billion for FY 1971-1975—was based on the alleged military inferiority of South Korea relative to North Korea.

With its assets, South Korea should be able to defend itself against the North. If it feels incapable of doing so, then either it lacks the will or its military doctrine and structure are deficient. True, the North Koreans have considerably more armor

⁵⁴ This need not require additional funds, since greater tank and antitank capabilities could be traded for less infantry, artillery, and logistic equipment.

and almost 2.5 times as many combat aircraft (578 to South Korea's 235), but the South Koreans have 30-2/3 mobilizable division equivalents as against only 23-1/3 divisions for the North Koreans.⁵⁵ That raises the question of whether or not the U.S.-sponsored force modernization program is attacking the real problem. The program is designed to replace old equipment with newer, more complicated equipment, generally on an item-for-item basis. For example, towed artillery is being replaced by expensive self-propelled artillery, which will increase further the already high operations and maintenance costs subsidized by the United States. One justification for the so-called artillery modernization program is that the North's artillery outranges the South's.⁵⁶ That imbalance will not be corrected, however, by supplying tracked artillery, since tracked and towed artillery have the same range. Soviet-designed artillery is composed of longer-tubed gun/howitzers and field guns, while the U.S.-made are almost all shorter-tubed, shorter-range howitzers.⁵⁷

The greater part of the army costs, however, stem from the search for more ground and air mobility—meaning not only complex tactical trucks for cross-country mobility, but also armored personnel carriers and helicopters.⁵⁸ It has been argued that such equipment is needed to modernize Korea's U.S.-style divisions. But the fundamental question is whether the U.S. military model is desirable in the Korean context or whether the modernization program is misdirected and unnecessarily costly. The South Koreans do indeed need new combat equipment to support a larger number of smaller and lighter defensive divisions. They need a heavier ratio of machine guns and mortars for their units (not planned), and they need to replace the obsolete M-1 rifle with the M-16 (as planned).⁵⁹ They should also replace the old towed howitzers with the new family of towed howitzers and in the process replace most 105-mm howitzers with more cost-effective multiple rocket launchers, heavy mortars, and 155-mm howitzers. Those are all relatively inexpensive changes. Moreover, such simple systems require little backup except for wartime resupply,⁶⁰ which

⁵⁵ Ten of the South Korean divisions are cadre divisions. South Korea also has an advantage in numbers of artillery pieces and rates of fire from a greater resupply capacity. North Korea, on the other hand, has an advantage in antitank and antiaircraft weapons. Both countries have dated weapons in their inventory. (International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1972-1973*, pp. 50-51.)

⁵⁶ *Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations for FY 1972*, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p. 462.

⁵⁷ Thus, while the main U.S. artillery weapon is the 105-mm howitzer with a range of 11,500 m, the main Soviet piece is a 122-mm howitzer with a range of 15,300 m. While our heavy 155-mm and 8-in. howitzers have ranges of 14,600 and 16,800 m respectively, the Soviets use a 152-mm gun/howitzer with a range of 17,200 m and a 130-mm field gun with a range of 27,000 m. The only U.S. artillery piece out-ranging Soviet artillery is the awkward and somewhat unsatisfactory 175-mm self-propelled gun. The Soviets prefer field guns to howitzers primarily because of their superior antitank capabilities.

⁵⁸ *Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations for FY 1972*, p. 462.

⁵⁹ Another justification given for the present modernization program is that the North Korean's "AK-47 assault gun provides the individual soldier with considerably more firepower than his South Korean counterpart," *Foreign Assistance Act of 1971*, June 1971, p. 365. Simply replacing the M-1 with the M-16 would correct that imbalance very cheaply. The embarrassing fact is that this small-arms deficiency has existed since the mid-fifties and is only now being recognized. The U.S. Army was the last major army to replace the rifle. The M-1 rifle was not replaced in Europe until 1962; even then it was replaced with an essentially improved M-1 with a 20-round magazine rather than an 8-round clip. It has only been since Vietnam that the U.S. Army has come to appreciate the value of an automatic weapon for the individual rifleman. But even though U.S. infantry units have now greatly increased the firepower capability of their small arms, unit TO&Es and tactics remain essentially unchanged.

⁶⁰ For a U.S. infantry division in "defense of position," about 47 and 10 percent of all resupply tonnage are for artillery and mortar rounds, respectively. Yet the firepower scores for those weapons in an infantry division (of 9 infantry and 1 tank battalions) are almost identical. Moreover, manpower requirements for the mortars are only 40 percent as great as for division artillery. Mortars by weight are more effective than artillery because of their more perpendicular impact angle, thinner shell casings relative to explosive charge, and reduced propulsion charges.

can be handled by peacetime prepositioning and by the mobilization of civilian trucks in wartime.

Three final objections to the present modernization program for Korean forces are based on the fact that "modernization" is a dynamic process—to be viewed relative to the enemy and over time:

First, much of the North Korean inventory consists of old Soviet equipment. If the Soviets were to modernize the North Korean Army, the relative gain envisaged in the current five-year program would be lost. However, the relative advantage to be gained by restructuring the South Korean Army would *not* be lost by a similar North Korean reaction because the North Koreans have already adopted a relatively appropriate force posture.

Second, modernization is a continuous requirement. The present modernization program may *temporarily* lower operations and maintenance costs because existing equipment is too obsolete and too old to be efficiently maintained.⁶¹ However, future operations and maintenance costs will gradually rise above present levels because of the greater complexity of the new equipment. Since operations and maintenance costs are such a large fraction of the costs of a U.S.-designed force,⁶² and South Korea will remain unable to cover its own operations and maintenance costs for a long time, it is important to devise a military structure for South Korea that will minimize those costs. Expanded numbers of light-infantry divisions, as used by the North Koreans and the Chinese, provide an alternative worth examining by the ROK.

Third, and most important, the current modernization program will increase South Korea's dependence upon U.S. logistic support in a warfighting situation.⁶³ For political reasons alone, it is desirable to design a South Korean force that will not be so fully tied to an American umbilical cord. The North Korean warfighting style is not so logistically demanding and they would consequently be less dependent upon their suppliers. Thus the answer does not lie in expanding South Korea's sustaining logistical tail, as many believe. Rather, the solution is to redesign the force away from heavy reliance upon massive *artillery* firepower, mobility, and sophisticated equipment—all of which require much expensive external support.

Subtheater Air and Naval Requirements

Local naval requirements for subtheater warfare consist mainly of coastal defense. Local airpower requirements, however, are often greater for subtheater than theater warfare because of (1) the likely withholding of U.S. airpower in a subtheater conflict and (2) the viability of a small nation's airpower against another minor power.

Interceptors are the primary air requirement because of the air-defense orientation of Soviet-style tactical airpower. Unless a measure of local air cover is attained, defending troops are vulnerable to the enemy's limited capability for offensive air operations, and one's own fighter-bombers cannot perform their ground-

⁶¹ *Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations for FY 1972*, p. 462.

⁶² Roughly 25 percent of the U.S. military budget goes for operations and maintenance. In actuality operations and maintenance costs are even higher, since the resource costs (military labor and equipment) of military service units are funded under non-O&M categories.

⁶³ This has been recognized by numerous U.S. Government sources, which have stated that the South Korean Army is almost totally dependent on U.S. logistic support for sustained operations.

support missions. Moreover, general, long-term air superiority can no longer be obtained by bombing the enemy's airfields, because the losses can be replaced by the enemy's major-power suppliers and the attrition rate of allied aircraft attacking sheltered aircraft (as in North Korea) could be prohibitively high.

Secondary air requirements include air-delivered ordnance for close air support of ground forces and for battlefield and supply interdiction.⁶⁴ The advantage of airpower for close air support is its mobility and hence its potential for rapidly reinforcing threatened sectors of a defensive front. Close air support is therefore particularly valuable (if it can survive) against high-speed, mechanized armies. Against slow-moving infantry armies, army ground units are generally able to react and to reinforce, and airpower loses some of its advantage. The drawback of most air-delivered ordnance is its low cost-effectiveness. With the high operational and system costs and low kill probabilities of present air-delivered ordnance, offensive air capabilities are too expensive for widespread use by MAP-supported countries. Not unless "smart" ordnance is distributed to such countries and aircraft redesigned for more specialized functions will airpower regain its cost-effectiveness.⁶⁵ However, while new laser technology will increase the potential for airpower (but also for air defense), ground-to-ground laser-guided systems will be significantly cheaper and easier to integrate into the army's fire planning, and hence may eventually replace much of the demand for close air support.⁶⁶

The mission of deep supply interdiction is most attractive in the special terrain and combat environment of Southeast and South Asia. In most other areas, supplies cannot be choked off by interdiction because the transport network cannot be readily blocked and aircraft cannot loiter over the transport system to destroy vehicles.⁶⁷ Even in South and Southeast Asia, supply interdiction is really attractive only against a weak air defense, when firing platforms of the AC-130 gunship type, with their substantial loitering capacity, can be used. High-performance aircraft, even with "smart" bombs, are too expensive for supply interdiction except for supporting slower and more vulnerable aircraft by suppressing air defenses and for destroying well-defended but high-value targets such as a transport network that could be blocked by the destruction of vulnerable tunnels, bridges, or passes.

The air mission of battlefield interdiction, primarily to disrupt the enemy's timing and coordination of battle plans, is mainly relevant in high-speed armored warfare. With infantry masses, such timing is less critical. The secondary mission of battlefield interdiction is killing enemy personnel and destroying enemy equip-

⁶⁴ The distinction is that battlefield interdiction is primarily designed to disrupt the enemy's mobility and coordination of planning, while supply interdiction is designed to choke off enemy supplies.

⁶⁵ In a NATO context, "smart" ordnance makes tactical air (on the margin) more effective for attriting enemy armor than equal-cost armored divisions. However, even though investment costs may be low for used aircraft, that cost-effectiveness is questionable in Third World areas, which need not prepare for the tempo of Soviet warfare, and where the opportunity costs of capital and skilled technicians are high.

⁶⁶ For instance, the army is now contemplating using the 155-mm howitzer as a firing platform for laser-guided antitank ordnance. "155 Eyed as Anti-Tank Weapon," *Army Times*, March 15, 1972, p. 39. Such a low-cost and responsive weapon added to the artillery target-acquisition system would virtually eliminate Forward Air Controller (FAC)-directed close air support and reduce the Air Force's ground-support mission to battlefield interdiction and, where attractive, supply interdiction.

⁶⁷ In Europe, supply requirements for mechanized armies are high but road networks are dense; in Asia, networks are sparse, but light-infantry resupply requirements are relatively small.

ment and supplies. For that role, the choice of aircraft should depend on enemy air defenses.⁶⁸

On balance, the all-purpose aircraft composing the U.S. air fleet are too expensive and complex for MAP recipient countries. Partial recognition of this problem has led in recent years to the development of the F-5 International Freedom Fighter, although some countries consider even this aircraft too sophisticated for their needs and capabilities. U.S. aircraft were designed for mission flexibility as the result of U.S. requirements in World War II, which are no longer valid. In World War II, when the American military had the task of invading land masses, the optimal tactic was to concentrate airpower for the sequential process of obtaining *air superiority* to operate in the air without enemy interference; carrying out *interdiction* to isolate the ground battle area; and, finally, providing *close air support* for the invading ground forces. In the future, those missions will probably have to be accomplished simultaneously, and a mix of greater numbers of cheaper, specialized aircraft—together forming an all-purpose capability—is more efficient and more effective than generalized, all-purpose aircraft. Interceptors should not be burdened with the payload, design characteristics, or electronics packages necessary for close air support and deep interdiction. For close air support, multipurpose, high-performance aircraft are too costly (in operations and maintenance costs and attrition losses) and deliver their ordnance less accurately than slower, more rugged aircraft.

THREAT POSSIBILITY: SUBTHEATER INSURGENCY AND BIG-UNIT INSURGENCY COMBINED WITH AN EXTERNAL THREAT

Two other types of threats remain to be examined: insurgency accompanied by an external threat, which seems a real danger only in Southeast Asia, and insurgency without outside invasion, which of course threatens countries anywhere in the Third World. The latter is therefore the more general situation and will be discussed first.

Insurgency

Counterinsurgency planning has in general been the stepchild of military-assistance programs, owing to a blind spot in U.S. military doctrine and to the reluctance of certain countries, such as Thailand, to emphasize counterinsurgency

⁶⁸ Where air defenses are weaker, general agreement exists that slower, more rugged aircraft (like the Navy A-1 and even the better World War II fighters) are preferable to modern high-performance jets. Which type of aircraft is preferable against more sophisticated air defenses is inconclusive. In low-altitude attacks, slower aircraft are no more vulnerable than jets. While jets use speed to reduce their exposure, slower aircraft have back-up control systems and more armor plating and infrared shielding. Against heat-seeking weapons, high-speed jets currently have an advantage because of the missiles' "catch-up" problem. As missile speeds increase, jets will lose that advantage because of their more intense "hot-spot" signatures. At higher altitudes against antiaircraft weapons with a larger explosive charge, the two aircraft are equally vulnerable to missiles, but hits are more damaging and hence the tradeoff gives a slight advantage to the high-speed jet because of its reduced exposure time. In short, the advantage of the high-performance aircraft is mainly its greater ability to protect itself against enemy interceptors in a sophisticated air-defense environment. High-performance aircraft will therefore often be needed for interdiction missions. But in environments where the interceptor does not pose a serious threat or can be adequately guarded against, the presumption should be in favor of slower, more rugged aircraft.

properly in their defense planning. Conventional armies have oriented themselves toward fighting the armies of other nations in formal warfare. Playing a major role against insurgent nationals prior to the conventional, or Phase III, stage of guerrilla warfare did not fit the American military's image of their function (see footnote 29 of this section). As a result, MAP focused upon hemispheric defense in Latin America until the late fifties and upon thwarting conventional invasions elsewhere.

The activist mood of the early Kennedy years led to the use of MAP against the newly perceived threat of "wars of national liberation." Against lower-level insurgencies, MAP developed civic-action programs which were based on the thesis that the military should win the "hearts and minds" of the people to obtain their cooperation against insurgents. Though low in cost, the civic-action programs were ineffective against active insurgencies because they failed to grapple with the key issues: social justice, physical security for the population, and eradication of the insurgent infrastructure. MAP's most serious deficiencies, however, resulted from continued belief in the efficacy of conventional military forces against insurgencies and from the failure to recognize that the military should have a supporting rather than a primary role in counterinsurgency operations. The bulk of MAP funding—even though often justified as being for counterinsurgency—continued to be spent on forces more appropriate for conventional warfare.

The essential functions of governmental forces in an insurgency are *police* and *police-intelligence* activities. These functions are low-cost. They are necessary for providing continuous, personal security to the population and to the government's administrative apparatus and for counteracting the insurgency system. The key target for governmental forces is the insurgent movement's organization, not its military forces. Identifying and penetrating that organization is a police-intelligence task. Eradicating it requires disrupting its communications, isolating its components, and targeting individual members—a combined task for intelligence, police, and supporting military units. Thus, effective counterinsurgency calls largely for police skills, while the special military skills it does require are not characteristic of conventional armies.

Armies that have been successful against insurgents—such as the Indonesian—have learned from experience to combine combat functions with police and police-intelligence functions. Such armies operate as field-police forces more than as conventional armies oriented to external threats. That is not to say, however, that such armies might not also be more effective in defending their countries from invasion than generalized conventional forces which might have been based on a foreign model.⁶⁹

The essential police and intelligence functions require intimate knowledge of the local population. Western standards of military doctrine and organization work against the military's acquiring such knowledge.

First, in many Western countries—particularly those of English heritage—that knowledge is denied the military for historical and political reasons.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ A case in point would be a South Vietnamese defense against a Chinese invasion (discussed above). The strategy would be to employ small, specialized forces in blocking and holding, while light-infantry field-police units used unconventional tactics to move behind the heavier enemy units, which would be less familiar with the terrain and dependent on a line of communications to project themselves into hostile territory.

⁷⁰ The British emphasized police and police-intelligence functions in their colonial administrations, but they were the province of the civil police.

Second, Western conventional armies (including the Russian) stress violent line combat against an armed enemy, and Western military thought stresses the aggressive offense and military victory. Insurgent forces stress the opposite—disengagement, stealth, evasion, and the gradual erosion of the government's strength and credibility.

Third, conventional forces are not organizationally suited for a supporting role. The army's function in counterinsurgency operations should be to ensure the viability of the police and police-intelligence systems. That can only be accomplished by active patrolling and ambush, particularly at night, to suppress enemy movement and communications, thus (1) ensuring that enemy groupings cannot overpower the police and (2) denying the local insurgent organization aid and information from outside their locality.

Conventional forces are simply not organized to generate the number of infantrymen required for these roles, and many of their weapon systems are too indiscriminately destructive for internal warfare. Actual infantrymen constitute only a small fraction of a conventional army's total strength; yet they are the only part of the force useful for supporting the police.⁷¹ Artillery and airpower inflict so much collateral damage that they are counterproductive in many cases; only small amounts of force are necessary if the right tactics are used. Elaborate logistical and other supporting elements are not necessary as long as the military units are not used as conventional forces, with the consequent demand for mobility, firepower, and heavy logistical support. Moreover, if the army took up its police-support role early enough, the insurgents would be unable to group into the big units that would require the use of such heavy weapons and elaborate logistics.

Big-Unit Insurgency Combined with an External Threat

As a result of their Vietnam experience, many U.S. Army officers now believe that conventional organization and tactics are not efficient against guerrillas. However, they argue that the insurgency in Vietnam has been more complicated than insurgencies elsewhere, and that they had no choice but to organize for the "worst case"—an attack by big enemy units. Failure to so organize, they argue, would have left U.S. and Vietnamese army units open to piecemeal defeat. The U.S. military strategy in Vietnam was therefore designed as a "rock-breaking" strategy to fragment the enemy into little units (the opposite of Mao's classic three-stage buildup) through main-force operations by conventional forces. The force design was also compatible with meeting an invasion from across the DMZ.⁷²

⁷¹ During the peak period of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, the infantrymen component of U.S. forces (i.e., infantry platoons) amounted to about 7 percent of total U.S. military manpower and consumed 2 percent of total U.S. budget costs.

⁷² For an explicit exposition of the rock-breaking thesis, see Lt. General Richard G. Stilwell, "Evolution in Tactics—The Vietnam Experience," *Army*, Feb. 1970, pp. 14-23. According to this thesis, "The war's operational patterns can be likened to the Vietnamese hand production of aggregate for concrete: first the boulder is broken up by a sledge, spalling tools reduce the resultant large fragments still further, and finally many people with tap hammers complete the disintegration process." From the *military planner's* viewpoint, that strategy also permitted deployment to Vietnam of standard all-purpose divisions. Since Vietnam was only one part of their responsibility, military planners did not want to disrupt the system by organizing specialized air and ground units that could not be deployed in other theaters (Europe, in particular).

However, a counterinsurgency strategy should focus instead on the system that gives the insurgents sustenance and regenerative capacity, which a "rock-breaking" strategy does not do. It seeks big-unit confrontations rather than trying to minimize them until after the insurgent system has been weakened and its losses are difficult to replace.⁷³

Maintaining a continuous army presence at local levels to support the police and to sever the insurgents' network of sustenance is not without risks, of course. Some analysts have suggested that a strategy of continuous pressure would expose troops to piecemeal defeat, considering the inadequate number of combat units. This danger can be overcome by installing an integrated grid and reserve system⁷⁴ and by breaking up support-heavy conventional units into simpler light-infantry units to man the local grid, the grid's immediate reserves, and a national system of mobile brigades to fight the enemy wherever he appears in strength. Those manning the grid do not need large artillery or extensive air support; they require little high-mobility transport except the reserves (partly because continuous presence makes it unnecessary), and, with the elimination of so much equipment, grid forces have modest logistical requirements. Equally important, by specializing according to function, the number of *deployable* brigades that can be concentrated for big-unit warfare can be actually *increased*.

In designing a force structure suitable against both insurgency and big-unit warfare, planners must not focus exclusively on any single threat. Conventional armed forces are really suitable only for responding to an invasion or the late combat phase of insurgency, such as the 1968 Tet offensive or the April 1972 invasion of South Vietnam. They are not suitable for countering low-level conflict or crushing a Tet-type offensive in its preparatory stage. Instead, a locally billeted, light-infantry or paramilitary force is needed to forestall the buildup to a quasi-conventional conflict.⁷⁵

Military units of both types (conventional and paramilitary) are required to complement each other. Neither is viable without the other. The paramilitary, by helping local village police to cement government control, is necessary to strip the enemy of its anonymity, to suppress its sources of intelligence and local support, to block its tactic of surprise, and most important, to force it to operate with units of at least platoon size. The conventional military's function is at the opposite end of the spectrum: to block an invasion,⁷⁶ to target large units for annihilation, and to

⁷³ A foreign component like the NVA is also dependent upon the local infrastructure for intelligence, guides, and many elements of supply.

⁷⁴ The weak link in an insurgent system is communications. If communications (largely personal contact by a network of messengers, "tax collectors," party functionaries, etc.) are suppressed, the system ceases to function and its members become individually vulnerable. Suppression requires a *grid* of small night-ambush points to hinder movement by individuals and small parties. The *reserve* system ensures the viability of the grid by preventing piecemeal defeat of the ambush grid and local reserves, and it entraps and annihilates larger enemy units coming into contact with the grid.

⁷⁵ The two varieties of paramilitary organizations are a full-time light infantry and a part-time military colony responsible for much of its own sustenance. The part-time force can be termed a People's Army; it is particularly appropriate for a protracted conflict where costs must be kept as low as possible. If resources (e.g., external U.S. aid) are ample or external invasion is highly likely, then a full-time infantry that is easier to reconstitute into larger units is the more appropriate. For an elaboration of the People's Army theme, see Brian M. Jenkins, *A People's Army for South Vietnam: A Vietnamese Solution*, R-897-ARPA, The Rand Corporation, November 1971.

⁷⁶ External invasion has been the "worst-case" threat that has shaped Vietnamization and the ARVN posture. Yet, paradoxically, the ARVN force in the DMZ area was an all-purpose infantry division rather

prevent the enemy from operating in units large enough to succeed against the many but widely dispersed paramilitary units.

Airpower for Counterinsurgency

U.S. counterinsurgency operations are notable for their massive use of expensive airpower. During the peak period of U.S. participation in the Vietnam war, almost half of total U.S. costs went for airpower (including army gunship and troop-transport helicopters), with more than half of airpower costs going to supply interdiction. That so much emphasis was placed upon supply interdiction can be explained by:

1. The U.S. tendency to project its own massive logistical requirements onto the enemy.
2. The military's prepossession toward big-unit war.
3. A measure of interservice rivalry and some weakness in the unified command structure. The Army relied primarily on artillery and its own helicopters for fire support (and battlefield interdiction was not a major target category), and the only "piece of the action" for the Air Force and the Navy was supply interdiction.
4. Deep supply interdiction that was rationalized as the means of "signaling" to the enemy and bringing the war home to North Vietnam, according to theories of limited war then in vogue.
5. The need to support morale in the South, and to emphasize continued U.S. commitment in the withdrawal phase.

Those rationales (as well as cost-effectiveness criteria) reveal a misunderstanding of what sustains an insurgency. The key to effective counterinsurgency is disrupting the insurgents' link to the population—their infrastructure. Because the insurgents' military system requires relatively few military supplies (even for big-unit insurgency), much of what is needed can be supplied locally. Therefore, interdicting the enemy's *external* supply lines aims at only a fraction of his total logistical needs. Furthermore, as we have seen in Vietnam, long-term supply interdiction by airpower can be successfully countered by pushing more supplies into the pipeline and by so-called "ant" tactics of transporting supplies. The basic solution against even big-unit insurgency is thus not to be found in air interdiction but in conducting the ground war so as to disrupt the insurgent infrastructure.

Countries facing only an insurgent threat do not have expensive airpower requirements. Instead of high-performance aircraft, they need unsophisticated fighters and firing platforms with a loitering capability. Countries also facing external attack, of course, have an additional tactical airpower need, as discussed earlier.

than a force specialized for the area. A force designed for the DMZ area should be built around a permanently stationed, mechanized core that could act as a holding force until light-infantry reinforcements could be brought in. While some fortifications would be desirable (an infiltration barrier along the DMZ's coastal plains and blocking strong points along the coastal highway), the mechanized force would remain the critical factor because of the ease of outflanking any barrier and the fact that the DMZ is fortuitously one of the few areas in South Vietnam suitable for mechanized operations. Had such a posture been implemented, ARVN would have been better prepared against the NVA offensive on Quang Tri in April 1972.

The undeniable utility of helicopters also should be put in perspective. The ability to move combat units from place to place is not a substitute for a continuous military presence to establish working relationships with the local population and government agencies. Much of the perceived requirement for air mobility of ground troops stems from a shortage of infantry. The solution is to create more infantry by restructuring the all-purpose conventional forces into more specialized counterinsurgency forces, and into special blocking forces to hedge against the possibility of an invasion. Air mobility would then be needed only for rapid reinforcement, emergency resupply, and counterthrusts by reserves.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED DEFENSE POSTURES

The United States has designed a general-purpose force to meet a wide variety of contingencies. Whatever its validity for U.S. needs, this design is overly expensive and generally inappropriate for local Third World forces. They do not need and cannot afford all-purpose, multiple capabilities; instead, they should be tailored to the specific threats faced by the country concerned. That may complicate U.S. planning and dispel the illusion of a worldwide allied order of battle, but it is a reasonable price to pay for a considerable increase in military efficacy.

For financial as well as strategic reasons, the United States must encourage appropriate and cheaper military postures for its MAP recipients. The domestic U.S. political pressures for reduced military and security-assistance expenditures are well known. Less recognized is the influence of secular trends—the greatly reduced availability of surplus weaponry, which sustained the post-World War II and post-Korea MAP programs and even Vietnamization; the escalating cost of weaponry, which both reduces the current U.S. inventory base and raises the cost of “modernization” (as currently interpreted) in the future; and finally, the growing divergence between U.S. equipment needs against sophisticated opponents in Europe and Third World needs for different types of defenses.

While U.S. contingency planning for the deployment of U.S. forces in the Third World may become increasingly oriented to air and sea power, Third World countries' *own* military strategies should center on their ground forces. Apart from suggesting a useful division of military labor, that focus involves more fundamental considerations. First, the United States can rapidly furnish reinforcements of air and sea power, but not always of ground forces, even if they exist in the active U.S. inventory. Second, the airpower of small nations will not be viable anyway against the Soviets and is only conditionally viable against the Chinese. Third and most important, the resource endowments of these countries dictate labor-intensive ground forces, and land warfare is the dominant element in their defense plans. They need not project themselves beyond their borders and across the seas. Their sole concern is self-defense against threats ranging from direct invasion to internal subversion. They cannot cope with major-power threats by fighting with conventional means; nor can they perform well against internal subversion by means of conventional tactics. Unique solutions must be sought that take advantage of local conditions. Armies are less constrained by their equipment than are air and naval forces. Even American army equipment is not inappropriate so much because of its

complexity, as is often asserted, but because of the way it is used, i.e., the organizational and tactical system in which it is embedded.

The military establishments of Third World countries should be designed foremost to strengthen their independence and viability as nation-states. Regionalism and multilateral security arrangements, which the United States has pursued with such great effort, cannot play a major role in the defense of Third World countries. When a small nation is attacked, it must basically depend on its own resources and organizational skills, even if it does receive some external military and political support. Against a Soviet attack, regional assistance from neighbors would not likely be very useful, because of the blitzkrieg pace of Soviet operations. Against attacks by the Chinese or by a minor power, and against insurgency, regional assistance can be useful only if regional forces are airlifted or sealifted to the threatened nation. However, at present, the countries that could help each other are widely separated, and it would be difficult to move their forces as currently configured. Those forces have a low ratio of combat to support units, long logistical tails, and require excessive amounts of fuel and artillery ammunition. Lighter forces would simplify those problems.

In conclusion, it appears that the United States is still guided in its MAP decisions by strategic concepts that do not deal with reality. We still encourage our allies to adopt high-cost army and air force postures mostly based on U.S. models, whereas what they need are forces designed more for their own special environments. Though some heavy forces, particularly armored and antitank are still necessary, recipient countries primarily require light infantry adapted to their specific situations.

Defense postures recommended for the Third World countries examined in this section can be summarized as follows:

1. Greece and Turkey need barrier systems, territorial defense (unconventional warfare), and national redoubts to counter the Warsaw Pact threat.
2. South Korea needs barrier systems to counter the North Korean and Chinese threat.
3. Most countries of South and Southeast Asia and the rest of the Third World need constabulary forces and maneuverable light infantry.

IV. TOWARD A NEW OPERATIONAL APPROACH TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE

U.S. military assistance and arms sales are subject to considerations other than the goal of creating self-reliant defense establishments abroad. Some of those considerations are political—the desire to help a friendly regime, to reward good behavior, to lend prestige to allies, to provide tangible proof of a U.S. commitment, or to pay rent for bases and other facilities. Insofar as arms transfers reflect those concerns, the Nixon Doctrine is likely to have little impact on security-assistance policies. But the part of military assistance (grants, credits, excess equipment, supporting assistance) and sale of arms that is designed to provide defense potential against realistic threats can be tailored to concepts of self-reliance.

To implement the Nixon Doctrine, increasingly efficient controls and careful planning are needed in the administration of grants through the Military Assistance Program and through concessionary credit sales. With respect to normal credits and the cash sale of arms, some analysts contend that controls and guidelines are of less importance. They argue that if a country can pay for arms, let it buy what it wants. This commercial approach is, in fact, quite common among some European arms-supplying countries.

For the United States, however, the possible consequences of unrestricted sales suggest that for sophisticated weapons, guidelines similar to those applying to grants and credits should generally govern cash sales as well. The major reason for such caution is that if countries purchase equipment that is inappropriate to their defense needs, they are probably either acquiring an offensive capability, which may be used against neighboring countries, or are diverting resources away from other investments that might enhance security through economic development, and thus enhance international stability through nonmilitary means.

Given current U.S. arms transfer practices, it is extremely difficult to determine the dollar value of arms going to Third World countries, under a variety of programs and accounting procedures. In its September 19, 1972, report on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1972, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate states that it "has for some years been concerned over the failure of the Executive Branch to bring together into one coherent picture all of the bits and pieces in the total program of United States assistance to foreign countries." It is a safe assumption that in the 93rd Congress there will be increased pressure on the Executive Branch to present and justify in detail the total flow of American military equipment

overseas. Such a requirement will be facilitated by clearer conceptual understanding of the purpose to be served by transfers of materiel. If the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine requires greater attention on the types and quantities of arms that are sent abroad, the number of separate programs will have to be reduced, and accounting practices will have to show both dollar costs and program objectives more clearly than they do now.

In addition to streamlining the administration of arms transfers, implementation of the Nixon Doctrine will require new concepts of military planning. Currently, force modernization is viewed as a desirable goal; excess and obsolete equipment is considered virtually useless. Those views reflect the feeling that Third World military establishments should resemble U.S. forces as much as possible.

As has been pointed out above, modernization along U.S. lines is expensive (witness the over \$2 billion price tag for the five-year Korean force modernization program), especially in overhead, maintenance, and logistics costs. A shift to lower-cost programs in line with the concept of self-reliance developed in this report may secure Congressional support more easily in the years ahead. The portents are clearly audible in the September 19, 1972, report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate:

The outlook for the military assistance program over the following five years is murky at best. Based on a straight-line projection of the military levels recommended, not including military aid for South Vietnam and Laos beginning in FY 1974, the costs for FY 1974-78 will total \$7,250,000,000. The Department of State has projected costs of foreign military aid, credit sales, and supporting assistance for the period FY 1974-78 within a range from \$8,384,000,000 to \$12,096,000,000, also excluding military aid to Laos and South Vietnam which are now funded out of the budget for the Department of Defense.

THE TERMS OF U.S. ARMS TRANSFERS

Grants

Military assistance grants go, with the exception of small amounts allocated to Austria, Portugal, and Spain, to Third World countries. In FY 1971 \$525 million went to countries in the East Asia and Pacific region, \$161 million to countries in the Near East and South Asia region, \$18 million to Africa, and \$15 million to Latin America. For FY 1972 the estimated figures were \$372 million for East Asia and Pacific, \$110 million for Near East and South Asia, \$12 million for Africa, and \$15 million for Latin America. For FY 1973 the Executive Branch proposed figures closer to those of FY 1971, whereas Congress supported amounts closer to those for FY 1972. Security-supporting assistance, administered by AID, goes as a rule to countries which receive military assistance either through MAP grants, foreign military sales, or service funding. It is therefore also almost exclusively directed toward Third World countries. In FY 1971 the actual supporting assistance amounted to \$573 million; for FY 1972 the estimated supporting assistance was about \$583 million; and for FY 1973 the Executive Branch requested \$874 million,

but Congress was not willing to authorize larger amounts than in the preceding two years.

Grant aid has the paradoxical characteristic of being the least popular form of aid domestically and the most in demand among arms clients. It buys relatively little new equipment, and what it does provide is often drawn from "excess" U.S. stocks. Nearly two-thirds of all grant military aid goes for operating costs and training.

Since the equipment provided by grant aid is not always selected on the basis of a careful analysis of the recipient's most pressing defense requirements and may merely reflect availability, the operating and maintenance costs to the recipient are driven up. In time, more grants or local funds may be required to cover costs engendered by the poor initial selection of equipment.

A country receiving grants can often escape the obligation of looking carefully at the costs and benefits of alternative defense postures. The short-sighted view that whatever the donor provides should be accepted tends to prevail. Hidden costs are rarely seen.

Under pressure from Congress, grants are likely to diminish as a part of U.S. arms-transfer policies and may eventually be eliminated entirely. Nixon Doctrine guidelines for military assistance would seem to support that trend in order to promote self-reliance and to avoid the awkward relationship created when one country receives gratuities from another. Even grant aid for training will need to be revised, since it is intended at present to promote compatibility between U.S. doctrines and indigenous force structures. As U.S. doctrines are not always relevant to the defense problems of Third World countries, training should also emphasize the experiences of other military establishments, as exemplified in Sec. II.

Credits

Credits provided to Third World countries for the purchase of U.S. arms tend to obscure the real costs to the U.S. Treasury. The recent trend was toward charging commercial rates of interest and requiring repayment within ten years.⁷⁷ Sales on those terms have hidden costs only if the purchase price of the equipment is significantly discounted. Despite the trend toward hard terms in the granting of credits for arms purchases, significant exceptions still occur, often in the largest transactions. For example, providing \$500 million worth of credits to Israel, with repayment scheduled over 20 years at 3-percent interest, is a disguised way of making a substantial grant to that country. Such hidden costs to the United States are rarely made clear to the public or even to Congress, where some of the credits are routinely voted by overwhelming majorities.

For the poor countries of the world, large credit sales can rapidly produce a heavy burden of debt. Their export earnings are often largely consumed by servicing the external debt. Third World countries may be unable to meet the payments, and defaulting may become a common practice in the decades ahead. Political strains

⁷⁷ This, of course, placed the United States at a disadvantage compared with the Soviets, who offer equipment at heavily discounted prices on very easy credit terms. Europeans have also offered arms at concessionary credit rates. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1972 lengthened the time (from 10 to 20 years) for which credit may be extended to foreign countries for the purchase of military supplies and equipment.

will predictably follow from quarrels over debt repayment. Credits, like grants, can have unforeseen costs for both the recipient and the donor. Debt servicing, the risk of defaulting on payments, the tendency to buy inappropriate equipment if soft terms are offered, all have long-term implications that tend to inhibit the movement toward self-reliance that the Nixon Doctrine is intended to encourage.

In FY 1971, under the Foreign Military Sales Act, credit sales to Third World countries amounted to \$743 million, and in FY 1972 the estimated amount of FMS credit sales was \$550 million. For FY 1973 the Executive Branch proposed a program of \$629 million credit sales, of which \$527 million involved direct credit extended by the U.S. Government and the balance of \$102 million would be credit extended by private banking institutions, backed by U.S. Government guaranty. Congress wanted, in this instance also, to limit authorizations and set the credit ceiling at the level of FY 1972 transactions.

Cash Sales

At present only a fraction of foreign military cash sales go to the less-developed countries. In FY 1972 the total amount was \$238 million, compared with \$2,023 million to developed countries. For FY 1973 the Executive Branch estimated that the respective amounts would be \$336 million for the less-developed nations and \$1,845 million for the developed nations.

Instituting a policy emphasizing the cash sale of arms for hard currency at nondiscounted prices—at least for sophisticated weapons—would oblige Third World countries to assess their defense needs more carefully. All but the comparatively rich countries would probably avoid buying sophisticated, heavy weapons. As has already happened in Latin America, many might, of course, turn to suppliers other than the United States.

If the arms-transfer principles implicit in the Nixon Doctrine are accepted, and relatively inexpensive, easily maintained equipment is stressed in security-assistance programs, most countries, relieved of heavy operating and maintenance costs, would be able to afford much of the equipment they require. American private industry should be encouraged to take the lead in tailoring weapons for Third World environments. The United States would still have an interest in monitoring these commercial transactions for political sensitivity and for their compatibility with the Nixon Doctrine, but the sale of unsophisticated equipment should be less controversial since it requires no Congressional action.

THE NEED FOR "INTERMEDIATE MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES"

If the primary objective of U.S. arms-transfer policies to Third World countries becomes that of promoting their self-reliance through the adoption of doctrines, strategies, and equipment appropriate to the most likely threats facing them and their capabilities, several changes in current practices may be desirable. As argued before, U.S. equipment, since it tends to be heavy and expensive, may not always

be advisable for Third World countries. Either the United States will need to produce significantly different equipment, or it may have to countenance the occasional purchase by some of its traditional arms clients of French, German, or Swedish materiel, especially if the third option seems to be a turn to the Soviets for arms. Some U.S. credits and grants may even have to be used to purchase non-U.S. equipment, despite the obvious economic and political difficulties involved, unless, as part of the Nixon Doctrine, the United States undertakes a vigorous new R&D program to adapt previously developed equipment for the specific requirements of Third World countries and possibly even to develop new families of weapons especially for them.

After twenty years of concern with the economic development of the Third World, experts are becoming increasingly aware of the value of labor-intensive "intermediate technologies" suited to the agricultural, manufacturing, and distribution needs of countries in the early stages of industrialization. Avoiding the production processes associated with the latest Western methods, "intermediate technologies" seek simpler production processes that are more appropriate to the capital, labor, and managerial endowments of less-developed countries. Such technologies are meant to enhance productive capacity without the use of capital-intensive equipment.

Similarly, "intermediate military technologies" in support of restructured military practices should be developed by the United States for friendly countries in the Third World. Labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive military technologies would complement military doctrines stressing territorial and barrier defenses. Implementing them may require not just selection from the existing American inventory of arms and other materiel to fit the needs of foreign military establishments, but a global search for suitable equipment. Should nothing adequate seem to be available, an effort should be made to design new equipment tailored to the needs of the recipient country and, whenever possible, suited for its indigenous production. That would involve, contrary to the trend of the past two decades, less reliance on the latest developments in the "state of the art" and more concern for achieving results by relatively simple and cheap methods, using whenever possible the results of previous American and foreign R&D.

Rather than remaining dependent upon outside sources for their arms, more and more Third World countries should be able to produce, assemble, or repair equipment within their own country, under foreign licenses. That would be particularly feasible for the type of equipment that is appropriate to self-reliant military establishments. Argentina and Brazil already produce light weapons and armored personnel carriers and are assembling foreign tanks and military jet aircraft, in part with domestically produced components. India also has a substantial productive capacity for its defense establishment.

U.S. policy, which has already begun to move in that direction, should encourage more of such programs in Third World countries, which would also benefit their economic development. Greater scope may also exist for regional production and servicing facilities to gain economies of scale and to foster more technical and economic cooperation between countries with related security interests.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING

To prepare for crises in Third World countries, the United States must of course complement its regular aid programs with contingency planning to augment the defense potential of its friends in a crisis. Such planning should also seek to anticipate possible reversals of alignment, in which former Soviet clients might turn to the United States for help.

Crisis assistance has the advantage for the United States of keeping control over arms prior to their use; it provides a visible and dramatic sign of U.S. intentions and commitments; and, if well-designed, it can rapidly increase defense potential without obliging the recipient country to maintain equipment before it is used. The United States should increase its capacity to deliver to friendly governments, on short notice, equipment that is easily distributed, cost-effective, and available in significant numbers. That may mean standard equipment such as M-16 rifles, mortars, hand grenades, or antitank weapons. Or it may suggest the need for sophisticated and expensive equipment such as the Redeye missile, antitank guided missiles, and "smart" bombs, which can be quickly distributed to forces trained to use them and can rapidly boost defense capabilities. The recent crises that resulted in a rapid increase in U.S. military assistance to Jordan and Cambodia should be examined for lessons applicable to future emergencies.

The possibility that some Third World countries might break with their Soviet arms suppliers is of more than academic interest. Indonesia and Ghana dramatically shifted their foreign-policy orientations in the mid-1960s. Cambodia did likewise in 1970, and the Sudan followed suit, to a lesser degree, in 1971. In mid-1972, Egypt expelled Soviet military personnel. In a multipolar world, such switching is likely to become more frequent. If a country shows a desire to reduce its dependence on the Soviets (or Chinese), that is likely to be a very favorable development for the United States. What could be done in the military sphere to prevent Soviet (or Chinese) pressure on the breakaway state and allow the development of self-reliance and independence? Some form of military assistance, perhaps only on a modest scale, such as Ceylon now receives, might be enough to tip the balance in favor of self-reliance. In view of the likely frequency of these cases, the United States should be planning for them.

TRAINING: OUR OFFICERS AND THEIRS

U.S. policies for dealing with the complex problems of foreign countries and their military establishments have been formulated, designed, and implemented by generalists who have rarely had the opportunity to become thoroughly familiar with the specialized problems they have had to handle. Errors of judgment resulting from ignorance of "the facts about the facts" frequently went undetected, either because the crises that would have tested plans and preparations did not materialize, or because the abundance of American resources deployed yielded (though at excessive cost) results that, in the absence of valid alternatives for comparison, appeared satisfactory.

Lacking previous experience with the management of world affairs and of inter-

national crises of global import, the United States after World War II adopted a few general-purpose formulas that were made to work. They involved the use of overwhelming military and economic superiority, based on technological resources that surpassed those of any other country, to achieve general goals that were considered in the interest of the United States. Experience and disappointments in ensuing years have made it increasingly evident that the complexity of the world, with its many cultures, historical traditions, interests, and values, requires a much more sophisticated and specific approach to each problem. There is no single formula or doctrine applicable across the board.

American military service schools and the Defense Department's selection process for assignments and promotions have produced personnel who can perform well within the American military establishment. But the assimilation of American doctrines and procedures does not necessarily qualify one to understand foreign military establishments, with different doctrines, traditions, and resources. For that purpose, special training is required.

The training and employment of specialists in international security work is a challenge that has not yet been fully met by the Department of Defense. Only a small fraction of American military officers and specialists have been trained for close cooperation with foreign counterparts. In many instances, those who have dedicated themselves to such assignments have paid a heavy price in career terms by reducing their chances for advancement to the top positions in their services. If the future role of the United States in international security affairs involves a change from leadership to partnership, the deficiency in developing, nurturing, and supporting adequate manpower for the new tasks will have to receive attention equal to that currently given to the retention and enhancement of American technological superiority.

Whether the challenge of developing adequate manpower for the management of Third World security assistance can best be met by existing institutions within the military establishment or will require new service schools and special training assignments overseas is an organizational question that cannot be easily answered. But just as tailored defense postures and military aid programs are required, specially tailored training is also needed. The need is urgent if the Nixon Doctrine and the national-security strategy of realistic deterrence are to be put fully into operation. Only rarely has the U.S. Government tried to understand foreign military establishments as unique entities that have evolved from a specific environment and have adapted to particular challenges with varying degrees of success. Too little attention has been paid to their individual doctrines, traditions, experience, and management and combat practices. Consequently, we have been unable to design military-assistance programs that truly enhance the effectiveness of those military establishments, either for their own purposes or as our partners.

We have assessed their needs and potential not with a view to their optimal adaptation to their specific environment but from American criteria, based on our own doctrines, resources, and experience. In the process, we have not used our resources most cost-effectively and have failed to get full return on our expenditures.

While it is obviously impossible to provide specialists to anticipate all possible contingencies in the Third World, the U.S. military establishment of 2.4 million men and women could well include a corps of experts, each with deep knowledge of a particular Third World country, prepared to serve as advisers or liaison officers to

specific foreign military establishments. Such specialists should receive extensive and repeated training in the particular country, involving not only linguistic and political-economic background (as in the past), but also thorough familiarity with that country's military establishment. Future cooperation between U.S. combat forces and those of allied and friendly countries in the event of theater or subtheater conventional warfare would be facilitated by the training of American specialists for advisory or liaison roles now.

Correspondingly, training officers from friendly countries with U.S. combat or support units would enable the former to perform liaison functions in case of future need, instead of their having to learn "on the job," as in South Vietnam. Foreign military personnel should therefore continue to receive training in American service schools.

The experience of the 1950s and 1960s suggests that the psychological and political benefits from the training of foreign officers in U.S. service schools have been great. Many, perhaps most, foreign military officers invited to American service schools have returned to their countries with warm and friendly feelings toward the American people and have acquired "old school ties" with some American counterparts. Because in the Third World the military play an important political role in addition to their national-security task, such relations are valuable to the United States.

But as for enhancing the defense potentials of Third World countries, the results of such training programs for foreign military officers have been at best ambiguous. Exposure to American training has increased their professionalism and contributed to the modernization of their defense forces. As a by-product, it has also made many military officers in the Third World the driving force in their nation's quest for progress. In some Third World countries, the military are becoming pragmatic, goal-oriented technocrats, reshaping their country's governing procedures. But American training may also have led some to demand weapon systems and force postures that meet U.S. standards but are not necessarily best suited to the resources of their countries.

Considered in light of the Nixon Doctrine, those effects are a mixed blessing. In the long run, the military, acting as forces for progress in their countries, are likely to have a beneficial impact on the modernization of the Third World. In the shorter run, their enthusiasm for modernization may cause them to press for the acquisition of expensive, technologically advanced, sophisticated weapon systems, which their countries may not need and cannot really afford. The immediate result—in the 1970s—might be (1) a decrease in the self-reliance that the United States now seeks to encourage and (2) a drain on national budgets that can ill afford simultaneous expenditures for economic development and for capital-intensive defense forces. Therefore, unless they are men of exceptional good judgment and wisdom, the most radical modernizers in the defense establishments of Third World countries are likely to be the cause of an initial decline in self-reliance, rather than the builders of a national defense potential well adjusted to the present resources of their country and to realistic expectations about military assistance.

One is led to the conclusion that U.S. military service schools should continue to welcome officers from friendly countries, but that the training they receive should not be limited to prevailing American military doctrines. In particular, their training should enhance their desire for self-reliance while also preparing them to be—

in case of future need—the indigenous link with the U.S. combat forces that might be sent to help them defend their country. If “sympiosis” is to succeed, the requirement that some U.S. military officers should acquire deep knowledge of the military culture of specific foreign defense forces should be balanced by a requirement that foreign military officers acquire an understanding of American military culture.

In practice, this suggests that in U.S. military service schools the lessons learned in Vietnam about close combat cooperation between American and Vietnamese armed forces should be studied critically—both by U.S. officers who may later be called to provide the links with other foreign military establishments, and by foreign officers who might be assigned as the counterparts of American personnel coming to help them. Both United States and foreign officers will need a new kind of training to function well in the complex security environment of the Third World of the 1970s. Steps should be taken to introduce into training programs the notion that one can choose from a variety of doctrines and tactics, none of which is optimal under all circumstances, as well as concern for the human dimensions of security cooperation between the United States and its Third World friends.

Because of the critical value of resources in Third World countries, especially in view of the sharp competition between economic development and security as national priorities, a higher capability in resource management should be enhanced. Therefore, training in the United States should include the acquisition of knowledge and capabilities in the field of resource management. This type of training, which includes the management of manpower, materiel, and finance, must have a higher priority than the normal service training because of the limitations on U.S. funds for assistance and the relatively low degree of efficiency in the Third World countries’ defense management in general. Using limited U.S. funds only for service training would mean sacrificing the creation of highly needed capabilities and knowledge which the Third World educational system cannot furnish.

CONCLUSION

It is obvious that the Nixon Doctrine requires further refinement as a guideline for U.S. security assistance to the countries of the Third World. But of the various themes in the Doctrine, that of self-reliance stands out as the most useful, given current domestic U.S. opinion and evolving international realities. If Third World countries are relieved of the burden of preparing futile defenses against unlikely major-power incursions, they can begin to devote their modest resources to the more critical tasks of local self-defense and internal development.

For the United States, implementation of the Nixon Doctrine need not—indeed, should not—mean the expensive creation of U.S.-style military establishments abroad to reduce the likelihood and extent of direct U.S. intervention. That means of implementation would not only be expensive but also ineffective in bringing security to arms-receiving countries. Any U.S. arms-supply policy that is critically dependent upon generous congressional funding is likely to be untenable in the 1970s. Less costly programs can be designed to promote self-reliance in selected Third World countries.

An important first step in moving toward new arms-transfer policies is better

analysis of likely threats in light of evolving international realities. Since not all contingencies can possibly be planned for, U.S. resources should be allocated in view of U.S. interests and threats that are both plausible and dangerous to those interests. Balance of power considerations and deterrence by means of diplomacy and negotiations, rather than by forces-in-being, are all essential to the appreciation of threats to U.S. interests in Third World countries. Unfortunately, threat analysis has thus far focused upon single-faceted military solutions, both reflecting and preserving notions from the Cold War era about forward defense, alliances, containment, and so forth.

Some preliminary guidelines for arms transfers emerge from this study. Relatively simple equipment, low in unit cost, easy to maintain, and not needing complex logistic support, can be as effective as more expensive and sophisticated equipment, if put to work in conjunction with more context-specific military strategies and force structures. Such equipment is both cheaper to buy and cheaper to operate than the current general-purpose equipment. Moreover, since simple equipment usually is easily maintained, whereas sophisticated arms frequently are useless because of poor care, the defense potential of a nation is better assured by reliable if simple weapons than by complicated and expensive ones. Released from the pressure to imitate Western strategies and to maintain the complex equipment associated with them, Third World countries could dispense with large numbers of foreign advisers and could be free to work toward self-reliance. Because of the sophistication of materiel produced for consumption by the U.S. military, the United States may not always be able to furnish the appropriate arms for Third World countries. They may at times have to acquire arms from non-U.S. sources. U.S. policymakers may find it in the general interest to encourage that practice, when necessary, and, in exceptional circumstances, even provide credits for it.

Some equipment, particularly items that have high cost-to-weight ratios and are difficult to maintain, might best be held in U.S. inventories for rapid delivery and distribution in the event of a crisis. To provide for that contingency, the United States should give advance training with the sophisticated equipment and should set up an airlift and distribution system that can insure the rapid supply of operational weapons to foreign combat troops.

Unless it changes its policies governing security assistance, the United States will be unable to do much to promote the self-reliance of Third World countries. Means must be found to help these countries mobilize their human and economic resources for their own defense. Some of them may be able to produce their own arms. More important, many may be able to organize police forces, local militia defense forces, territorial forces, and various other paramilitary units, depending in large part upon the level of political development and the nature of the threat. A useful measure of self-reliance will be the degree to which a country taps these resources and develops indigenous doctrines that stress territorial defense and other forms of self-reliance rather than alliance commitments as the primary means of combatting threats.

The future training of U.S. military specialists and of foreign military officers in American service schools will play an important role in implementing Nixon Doctrine military assistance programs in the Third World. The content of such future training programs will require as careful attention as will the development of "intermediate military technologies" for the countries that the United States wishes to assist in increasing their defense potential.

Finally, the United States must recognize that self-reliant countries may not always be responsive to U.S. policy guidance. Such unresponsiveness will not be uncommon in the 1970s, and should not be considered sufficient reason to cut off assistance. Arms supply will not always be a potent lever for policymakers in the evolving multipolar world, but it may contribute to self-reliance, which itself reduces the dangers to the United States from chronic tensions and instability in the Third World.

